Israel Discount Bank Ltd. v. Kestenbaum, 62 N.Y.2d 150 (1984)
A party opposing summary judgment must present evidentiary facts sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact to defeat the motion.
Summary
This case concerns a dispute over a personal guarantee and a subsequent letter agreement. Israel Discount Bank sued Kestenbaum on a guarantee agreement. Kestenbaum argued the subsequent letter agreement released him from his guarantee and that the corporate officer lacked authority to enter the agreement. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that Kestenbaum’s conclusory allegations lacked sufficient evidentiary support to defeat summary judgment. The court emphasized the necessity of presenting factual evidence to create a genuine issue for trial.
Facts
Israel Discount Bank Ltd. (plaintiff) sought to enforce a personal guarantee against Kestenbaum (defendant).
The guarantee agreement was broad enough to encompass a subsequent letter agreement between the bank and Nu-Ka-Pool Apparel, Inc.
Kestenbaum alleged that the corporate officer who signed the letter agreement on behalf of Nu-Ka-Pool lacked the authority to do so.
Kestenbaum also argued the subsequent agreement released him from his personal guarantee.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court, New York County, granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and denied the defendant’s motion to serve an amended answer.
The Appellate Division reversed.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s order and judgment.
Issue(s)
Whether Kestenbaum presented sufficient evidentiary facts to defeat the bank’s motion for summary judgment based on his personal guarantee.
Holding
Yes, because Kestenbaum’s allegations were conclusory and unsupported by evidentiary facts sufficient to raise a triable issue regarding the scope of the guarantee or the officer’s authority.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals agreed with the dissenter in the Appellate Division that the guarantee agreement signed by Kestenbaum was broad enough to cover the subsequent letter agreement.
The court found that Kestenbaum’s allegation that the corporate officer lacked authority was a “conclusory allegation” insufficient to create a question of fact.
The court emphasized that none of Kestenbaum’s arguments were supported by “evidentiary facts sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”
The court noted the affirmation of Kestenbaum upon which he relied was not in an authorized form, as only attorneys, physicians, osteopaths or dentists authorized to practice within the state can serve and file an affirmation bearing his signature alone in lieu of and with the same force and effect as an affidavit, and even those persons cannot do so when they are a party to an action. The court clarified that while anyone can make an affirmation instead of a sworn statement, to be effective, it must be made before a notary public or other authorized official, so the affirmant would be answerable for the crime of perjury should he make a false statement.
In essence, the court reinforced the principle that to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must come forward with concrete evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial, rather than relying on mere allegations or unsubstantiated claims.