People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981)
Once a defendant is represented by counsel on a charge, even if that charge is unrelated to a new investigation, police cannot question the defendant about the new investigation in the absence of counsel if they are aware of the prior representation.
Summary
Bartolomeo was arrested and arraigned for criminal possession of stolen property. Subsequently, he was questioned about that crime and two rapes. He had counsel in connection to one of the rapes from a prior investigation. The Court of Appeals held that statements relating to the stolen car charge were inadmissible because his right to counsel had indelibly attached after arraignment on that charge. Further, because the police knew he had counsel on the prior rape charge, questioning on other matters, including the new rape charge, was precluded. The plea to the rape charge which was based on the erroneous denial of suppression was vacated, as was the other rape charge because the plea agreements were integrated.
Facts
Ms. McE reported a rape to police. Bartolomeo was represented by counsel for this charge in court proceedings related to a lineup.
Ms. P reported being raped. She gave the license plate number of the car used, which was found to be stolen. Police found Bartolomeo asleep in the car, arrested him, and arraigned him on criminal possession of stolen property. He was not represented by counsel at this arraignment.
Bartolomeo was then questioned about the stolen car and both rapes, making incriminating statements.
Procedural History
Bartolomeo was indicted on two counts of rape and one count of criminal possession of stolen property.
The County Court suppressed statements about the stolen property and the Ms. P rape, but admitted statements about the Ms. McE rape.
The Appellate Division reversed and granted the suppression motion in its entirety.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.
Issue(s)
Whether statements relating to the stolen car charge were admissible when Bartolomeo had been arraigned on that charge without counsel.
Whether statements relating to the Ms. McE rape were admissible when Bartolomeo had counsel for that charge from a prior proceeding, even though it was a different investigation.
Whether statements relating to the Ms. P rape were admissible given the illegal questioning about the stolen car and Bartolomeo’s representation by counsel on the Ms. McE rape charge.
Whether the pleas to both rape counts should be vacated if one plea was based on an erroneous denial of suppression.
Holding
No, because Bartolomeo’s right to counsel had indelibly attached after the arraignment on the criminal possession charge, and he could not be interrogated on that charge without counsel present.
No, because counsel having once entered the proceedings in connection with the charge under investigation, Bartolomeo could not waive his right to counsel in the absence of that attorney. The police and District Attorney were aware of the representation.
No, because the questioning was an integrated whole where the questioning about the criminal possession was “so interrelated and intertwined” with the questioning about the Ms. P rape. Additionally, the defendant was known to be represented by counsel in connection with the “McE” rape charge, questioning on other matters was precluded.
Yes, because the plea agreement with respect to the two rape counts was integrated and vacatur of one plea requires vacatur of both.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that once the right to counsel attaches, interrogation is prohibited unless counsel is present. This protection extends to questioning on matters that are “so interrelated and intertwined” with the charged crime. Because Bartolomeo had counsel on the McE rape charge, the police knew or should have known he had counsel and could not question him on any matter without counsel present.
The Court cited People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979) stating questioning on other matters was precluded when the defendant was known to be represented by counsel. “Moreover, as defendant was known to be represented by counsel in connection with the “McE” rape charge, questioning on other matters was precluded.”
The Court also agreed with the Appellate Division’s reasoning that the plea agreement was integrated, meaning that if one plea was vacated, both must be vacated. This ensures fairness and prevents the prosecution from benefiting from a plea bargain that was based on flawed evidence. “Inasmuch as the plea to the “McE” rape count was based on an erroneous denial of suppression that plea must be vacated. Additionally, we agree with the Appellate Division, and for the reasons stated in the opinion of Justice Guy T. Mangano, that, although the plea to the “P” rape count was made after suppression, nonetheless the plea agreement with respect to the two rape counts was integrated and vacatur of one plea requires vacatur of both.”