New York Law Review

People v. Favale, 56 N.Y.2d 449 (1982): Appealability of Resentencing Application Denials

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People v. Favale, 56 N.Y.2d 449 (1982)

In New York, there is no right to appeal the denial of an application for resentencing unless a statute expressly authorizes such an appeal.

Summary

The defendant, Favale, sought resentencing under Penal Law § 60.09, which allows for discretionary resentencing for certain drug felonies. His application was denied, and he appealed. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that because no statute explicitly allows an appeal from the denial of a resentencing application under § 60.09, no such right exists. The court emphasized the distinction between appealing a sentence or resentence and appealing the denial of an application for resentencing.

Facts

Favale was convicted of a class A-II or A-III drug felony. He applied for resentencing pursuant to Penal Law § 60.09, a statute designed to mitigate the harsh sentencing consequences of the 1973 drug laws in appropriate cases.

Procedural History

The trial court denied Favale’s application for resentencing. Favale appealed this denial to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal. Favale then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing jurisdiction was proper under CPL 470.60(3).

Issue(s)

Whether the denial of an application for resentencing pursuant to Penal Law § 60.09 is appealable in the absence of a specific statutory provision authorizing such an appeal?

Holding

No, because in the absence of a statute expressly authorizing a criminal appeal, there is no right to appeal in a criminal case in New York.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals based its decision on the fundamental principle that the right to appeal in a criminal case exists only when explicitly authorized by statute, citing Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 NY2d 59, 63. Since no provision in Penal Law § 60.09 or any other statute permits an appeal from the denial of a resentencing application under § 60.09, the Court concluded that the Appellate Division correctly dismissed Favale’s appeal.

The Court distinguished the case from situations where a defendant appeals from a sentence or resentence, which are covered by CPL 450.10(2) and 450.30(1, 2), or from the denial of a motion for resentencing under CPL 450.15(2) and 440.20. The Court reasoned that Favale was not appealing a sentence, but the denial of a request for resentencing, which is a different procedural posture.

The Court emphasized that the legislature’s failure to provide for an appeal in § 60.09 implies that no such appeal was intended. The Court stated, “Indeed, we are required to conclude that since the Legislature failed to provide for an appeal from the denial of an application for resentencing pursuant to section 60.09 of the Penal Law, no appeal was intended.”

The court explicitly declined to address the defendant’s arguments regarding the right to a hearing or representation by counsel during the resentencing application process, deeming those issues outside the scope of the procedural question before it.

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