People v. Brooklyn Home Dialysis Training Center, Inc., 56 N.Y.2d 505, 436 N.E.2d 1017 (1982)
An appellate division has the same discretion as a special term in deciding whether an injunction order should be vacated and may modify the order even absent abuse of discretion by the special term.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an injunction order issued under General Business Law § 354 automatically expires upon the commencement of a plenary action under § 353. The court held it does not, but emphasized the discretion of the Appellate Division to review and modify Special Term’s decisions on injunctions. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order without costs, allowing the respondents to apply to Special Term to vacate the original injunction in light of the new plenary action. The key takeaway is the reaffirmation of appellate courts’ broad discretionary power in reviewing injunction orders.
Facts
The Attorney General initially obtained an injunction against Brooklyn Home Dialysis Training Center, Inc. pursuant to General Business Law § 354. Subsequently, the Attorney General commenced a plenary action under General Business Law § 353 against the same parties. The respondents then sought to have the initial injunction vacated.
Procedural History
The Special Term made a determination regarding the injunction. The Appellate Division reviewed the Special Term’s order and modified it. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether an injunctive order issued pursuant to section 354 of the General Business Law expires automatically upon the commencement of a section 353 plenary action.
2. Whether the Appellate Division has the power to modify a Special Term’s order regarding an injunction, even if the Special Term did not abuse its discretion.
Holding
1. No, because it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the statute to terminate the section 354 injunction immediately upon commencement of the plenary action. Parties are protected by the right to move for dissolution of the section 354 order once the section 353 action has begun.
2. Yes, because the Appellate Division has the same discretion as the Special Term in deciding whether an injunction order should be vacated, and can modify the order in the exercise of that discretion.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that while an injunction application can be made in the plenary action, automatically terminating the § 354 injunction upon commencement of the § 353 action would be inconsistent with the statute’s purpose. The court stated that those facing a plenary action are protected by the right to move for dissolution of the § 354 order once the § 353 action has begun.
Regarding the Appellate Division’s power, the court emphasized its broad discretion, stating that the Appellate Division “has the same discretion as does Special Term in deciding whether an injunction order should be vacated and may, by way of reviewing the action of Special Term, modify its order in the exercise of discretion even though it cannot be said that Special Term abused its discretion.” The court cited Kover v Kover, 29 NY2d 408, 415, 2; Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Conway, 11 NY2d 367, 370-371; and O’Connor v Papertsian, 309 NY 465, 471, in support of this proposition. Because of this discretionary power, the Court of Appeals deemed the Appellate Division’s order