Tucker v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 378 (1982)
A plaintiff in a matrimonial action commenced before the effective date of the Equitable Distribution Law cannot discontinue that action solely to initiate a new action after that date to benefit from the new law’s broader property distribution provisions.
Summary
The wife initiated a divorce action before New York’s Equitable Distribution Law took effect. Seeking to benefit from the new law, she moved to discontinue her original action and file a new one under the Equitable Distribution Law. The husband opposed this and sought to amend his answer to include counterclaims for divorce. The Court of Appeals held that the wife could not discontinue her initial action solely to gain the benefits of the new law, as this would frustrate the legislature’s intent regarding the law’s applicability. The court also found that the lower court improperly conditioned the husband’s amendment to include counterclaims.
Facts
The wife commenced a divorce action on December 12, 1978, prior to the effective date of New York’s Equitable Distribution Law (July 19, 1980). In July 1980, the husband began a separate action for divorce. The wife, after the Equitable Distribution Law came into effect, moved to discontinue her original action intending to start a new one under the new law to benefit from its equitable distribution provisions. The husband opposed the wife’s motion and cross-moved to amend his answer to assert counterclaims for divorce.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court granted the wife’s motion to discontinue her action and denied the husband’s cross-motion. The Appellate Division reversed, denying the wife’s motion to discontinue and granting the husband’s cross-motion to amend his answer, but conditioned that amendment on the husband stipulating that the wife’s rights would not be affected even if she were found guilty of misconduct. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether a plaintiff who commenced a matrimonial action before the effective date of the Equitable Distribution Law may discontinue that action for the sole purpose of commencing a new action under the new law to take advantage of its more favorable property distribution provisions.
2. Whether it was proper for the Appellate Division to condition the grant of the husband’s motion to amend his answer on a stipulation that the wife’s rights would not be affected if she were found guilty of misconduct.
Holding
1. No, because allowing such a discontinuance would frustrate the legislature’s intent in defining the applicability of the Equitable Distribution Law.
2. No, because the condition improperly altered the substantive provisions of the law applicable to the pre-Equitable Distribution Law action.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that while courts generally have discretion to grant voluntary discontinuances, discontinuance should be denied when it would prejudice the defendant or lead to other improper consequences. The wife’s sole purpose in seeking discontinuance was to circumvent the legislative mandate that actions commenced before July 19, 1980, be governed by Part A of the amended statute, which did not include equitable distribution. Allowing the discontinuance would permit the wife to evade this mandate and receive disparate treatment compared to other plaintiffs in pre-July 1980 actions. The court stated, “Prevention of such intentional frustration of the considered decision by the Legislature…is an objective which mandates denial as a matter of law of the discontinuance requested in the present case.”
Regarding the husband’s appeal, the court noted that CPLR 3025(b) directs that leave to amend pleadings “shall be freely given.” The condition imposed by the Appellate Division improperly sought to circumvent the provisions of Part A, which would have allowed the husband to cut off the wife’s right to alimony if he proved her misconduct. As the wife acknowledged, the effect of the condition was to disregard both the mandate of the statute and the existence of the husband’s own independent action for divorce. The court concluded that the Appellate Division could not require the husband’s consent to a variation of the substantive provisions applicable to the Part A action.