People v. D’Angelo, 41 N.Y.2d 638 (1977)
The right to counsel does not automatically attach simply because a suspect is in police custody awaiting arraignment; it requires the commencement of formal adversarial proceedings.
Summary
D’Angelo was arrested and, before arraignment, interrogated by an Assistant District Attorney after waiving his Miranda rights. He made an inculpatory statement, which he later sought to suppress, arguing his right to counsel had attached due to being in custody awaiting arraignment. The New York Court of Appeals held that the right to counsel had not attached because no accusatory instrument had been filed, and the delay in arraignment was not a deliberate attempt to circumvent his right to counsel but rather to comply with the terms of a federal grant. The court also rejected the argument that a showup identification was the product of an illegal detention, finding that the defendant consented to return to the scene of the crime.
Facts
Following his arrest and processing at the New York County Criminal Courts Building, the arresting officers went to the early case assessment bureau to sign a complaint against D’Angelo.
Assistant District Attorney Mullady, who was on duty at the bureau, asked the officers to bring D’Angelo to him before any complaint was drawn.
Mullady identified himself and gave D’Angelo his Miranda warnings, which D’Angelo waived, agreeing to answer questions.
During this interrogation, D’Angelo made an inculpatory statement.
D’Angelo was also taken back to Nathan’s restaurant, the scene of the robbery, where a witness identified him in a showup.
Procedural History
D’Angelo sought to suppress the inculpatory statement and the showup identification.
The lower courts denied the motion to suppress.
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.
The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether D’Angelo’s constitutional right to counsel had attached solely because he was in police custody awaiting arraignment, precluding interrogation without counsel.
Whether the showup identification should be suppressed as the product of an illegal detention.
Holding
No, because no accusatory instrument had been prepared or signed, meaning no criminal action had commenced. Furthermore, there was no evidence the delay in arraignment was designed to allow for prearraignment interrogation or to deprive D’Angelo of his right to counsel.
No, because D’Angelo consented to accompany the officers back to the restaurant.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the right to counsel does not attach merely from being in custody awaiting arraignment. The critical factor is the commencement of formal adversarial proceedings, which, under CPL 1.20(17), requires the preparation and signing of an accusatory instrument. The court distinguished the case from situations where delays in arraignment are used to facilitate prearraignment interrogation, finding instead that the delay was for the independent purpose of conforming to the terms of a federal grant.
Regarding the showup identification, the court deferred to the affirmed finding of fact that D’Angelo had consented to return to the restaurant. This consent negated any claim of illegal detention.
The court emphasized that “no decision in our court so holds” that the right to counsel attaches merely because a defendant is physically in police custody awaiting arraignment. The court requires some formal step in the adversarial process before this right is triggered. The court implies that the focus should be on preventing deliberate attempts by law enforcement to circumvent the defendant’s right to counsel, not on creating a blanket rule that prohibits any questioning before arraignment.