People v. Lane, 56 N.Y.2d 1 (1982)

To defeat a motion to consolidate indictments when a defendant claims they wish to testify on one charge but not another, the defendant must convincingly show they have important testimony for one offense and a strong need to remain silent on the other.

Summary

Defendants Lane and Wells were charged with two robberies with similar facts. The prosecution moved to consolidate the indictments, arguing evidence of one robbery would be admissible in the trial for the other. The defendants opposed, stating they wished to testify about the first robbery (claiming it involved consensual sexual acts, not robbery) but not the second (relying on perceived weaknesses in the prosecution’s identification evidence). The trial court granted consolidation, and the defendants were convicted of at least one charge. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendants failed to demonstrate a sufficiently compelling reason to avoid testifying on the second charge. The Court adopted a standard requiring a “convincing showing” of both important testimony for one offense and a strong need to remain silent on the other to defeat consolidation.

Facts

Two men fitting the defendants’ descriptions were picked up hitchhiking on two separate occasions. In each incident, the driver was forced at knifepoint to drive to a location near Driving Park Bridge. The driver was then robbed, locked in the trunk, and the car was abandoned near the Genesee River Gorge.

Procedural History

The People moved to consolidate two indictments for robbery. The trial court granted the motion based on oral arguments. The defendants moved for reconsideration, submitting affidavits stating their desire to testify regarding the first robbery but remain silent on the second. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. Neither defendant testified at trial. The jury convicted both defendants of the first robbery. Wells was convicted of the second robbery, but Lane was acquitted. The Appellate Division affirmed all convictions, and the defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether a defendant must make a convincing showing of both important testimony concerning one offense and a strong need to refrain from testifying about another offense to defeat a motion by the People to consolidate two indictments, where consolidation is sought because proof of one offense would be material and admissible in the trial of the other.

Holding

Yes, because to defeat a consolidation motion under these circumstances, a defendant must make a “convincing showing” of both important testimony concerning one offense and a strong need to refrain from testifying about the other.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court’s decision to consolidate indictments is discretionary and reviewable only for abuse of discretion as a matter of law. The Court weighed the public interest in efficient trials against the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The Court adopted the standard from Baker v. United States, which requires a defendant to make “a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.” The Court found this standard applicable to consolidation motions because the same concerns of fairness and prejudice are present as in severance motions. The Court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Shapiro, noting that in Shapiro, the defendant had made a sufficient showing under the Baker test. In this case, the Court found the defendants’ stated desire to exploit a perceived weakness in the People’s identification evidence insufficient to demonstrate a “strong need” to refrain from testifying. The Court stated, “It was incumbent upon defendants to articulate in concrete terms why they would be unduly prejudiced by giving testimony on the December 2 count either supporting misidentification or simply denying the charge.” The Court noted that an in camera review could be used to protect a defendant from revealing privileged information to the prosecution. The court emphasized that “speculative fears of exposure to cross-examination regarding undocumented events and abstract claims of impeachment…should never be considered dispositive absent the most obviously egregious circumstances.”