People v. Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187 (1984): Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements After Attachment of Right to Counsel

People v. Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187 (1984)

A statement made by a defendant after the right to counsel has attached, but which is genuinely spontaneous and not the product of police inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence, is admissible in evidence.

Summary

Krom was arrested on a warrant for forging checks. After being informed of his rights, he declined to make a statement. While the arresting officer logged Krom’s arrest alongside those of his accomplices, Krom asked why he was charged with the same offense. The officer explained that anyone involved in the crime was equally guilty. Krom then made an incriminating statement, claiming he knew the checks were forged but didn’t fill them out himself. The New York Court of Appeals held that this statement was admissible because it was spontaneous and not the result of police interrogation or its functional equivalent, even though his right to counsel had attached upon the filing of the accusatory instrument.

Facts

The defendant, Krom, was involved in a scheme to pass forged checks at local gas stations. Krom’s friends, King and Reilly, forged the checks, and Krom presented them for payment, after which the proceeds were divided among the three. On March 16, Krom was arrested on a warrant. At the police station, after being read his Miranda rights, Krom declined to make a statement. As the arresting officer entered Krom’s arrest information into a police log, following entries for King and Reilly, Krom inquired why he was being charged with the same offense as his companions. The officer responded that anyone involved in the crime was equally guilty. Krom then stated that he knew the checks were forged after a few had been passed, but he didn’t fill them out or sign them.

Procedural History

Krom moved to suppress his statement, arguing it was obtained in violation of his right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion, finding the statement was volunteered. A jury convicted Krom of multiple counts of possession of a forged instrument and petit larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the statement was admissible as spontaneous.

Issue(s)

Whether a statement made by a defendant, after his right to counsel has attached upon the filing of an accusatory instrument and arrest on a warrant, is admissible if the statement was made in response to a brief, impersonal answer from a police officer and is deemed genuinely spontaneous.

Holding

Yes, because the defendant’s statement was spontaneous and not the product of police inducement or interrogation, despite the attachment of his right to counsel.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized that under the New York Constitution, the defendant’s right to counsel attached upon the filing of the accusatory instrument leading to the arrest warrant. This prevented the police from interrogating him or engaging in its functional equivalent in the absence of counsel. However, the court clarified that the rule “does not require the police to take affirmative steps, by gag or otherwise, to prevent a talkative person in custody from making an incriminating statement.” The court cited People v. Maerling, stating that volunteered statements are admissible if the defendant spoke with genuine spontaneity “and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed.” The court distinguished this case from scenarios involving police questioning or lengthy informal discussions. Here, the officer’s response was a “brief and impersonal” answer to Krom’s question, and did not constitute an interrogation tactic. The court noted, “The question in such cases is whether the police conduct should reasonably have been anticipated to evoke a statement from the defendant…and whether it can be said under the circumstances that the inculpatory statement was ‘made without apparent external cause.’” The court found no evidence that the officer deliberately prompted Krom’s question or that the officer’s answer went beyond the scope of the inquiry. The court likened the case to People v. Lynes, where a similar exchange was deemed spontaneous. Because there was support in the record for the lower court’s finding of spontaneity, the Court of Appeals affirmed.