People v. Pagan, 60 N.Y.2d 788 (1983): Determining Accomplice Status for Corroboration Requirements

People v. Pagan, 60 N.Y.2d 788 (1983)

A witness is an accomplice as a matter of law only if the jury could reasonably conclude, based on the evidence, that the witness participated in the charged offense or an offense based on the same facts or conduct.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a witness, Destino, was an accomplice as a matter of law in the intentional murder of James Amico, requiring corroboration of his testimony. The defendant argued Destino was an accomplice because of his involvement in the earlier assault and attempted robbery of Amico. The Court held that Destino was not an accomplice as a matter of law to the murder because the evidence did not conclusively link him to the intentional murder itself; his car loan was ostensibly for taking Amico to the hospital, and the intent to murder was formed later. Additionally, the murder was a separate crime from the initial robbery and assault, as the facts constituting the murder were distinct.

Facts

Destino was involved in the initial assault and attempted robbery of James Amico. Destino provided his car, purportedly to transport Amico to a hospital. Later, Destino learned that others had dumped Amico in the Barge Canal. There was a significant time interval between the assault and the murder. The agreement to use Destino’s car appeared to be for a different purpose than murder. Destino participated in removing bloodstains from his car after the murder.

Procedural History

The defendant was convicted of intentional murder. The defendant’s attorney moved for a trial order of dismissal at the close of the People’s case, arguing Destino was an accomplice as a matter of law, but the motion was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the witness, Destino, was an accomplice as a matter of law to the intentional murder of James Amico, thus requiring corroboration of his testimony under CPL 60.22.

Holding

No, because the evidence did not conclusively establish that Destino participated in the intentional murder or in an offense based on the same facts or conduct as the murder.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that under CPL 60.22, a witness is an accomplice requiring corroboration only if the evidence reasonably leads to the conclusion that the witness participated in the charged offense or an offense based on the same facts. The court found no direct connection between Destino and the intentional murder, other than the use of his car. The court emphasized that the car was provided under the pretense of taking Amico to the hospital, and the intent to murder was formed later. The court distinguished this case from People v. Cona, where there was an ongoing criminal enterprise. Here, the robbery and assault were separate incidents from the intentional murder. The court stated, “Nothing connects Destino to the intentional murder other than the use of his car. As to that, the only evidence adduced is that the car was provided so that Amico could be taken to a hospital, and that it was not until four hours later that Destino learned that the others…had dumped Amico in the Barge Canal instead of taking him to the hospital.” The court also cited Grunewald v. United States and the ALI Model Penal Code to support the argument that Destino’s act of cleaning bloodstains did not make him an accomplice. The court concluded that the facts and conduct involved in the robbery attempt and assault were distinct from those constituting the intentional murder, therefore Destino was not an accomplice as a matter of law.