Matter of City of Albany v. Albany County Board of Elections, 492 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1983)
A statute providing for automatic succession to a city office (like mayor) is not an ‘appointment’ to fill a vacancy under the New York State Constitution, and therefore does not trigger the requirement of a special election.
Summary
This case addresses whether New York General City Law § 2-a, which provides for the automatic succession of the President of the Common Council to the office of Mayor upon the Mayor’s death, violates the New York State Constitution’s provision regarding filling vacancies in office. The City Clerk of Albany sought a court order to compel a special election following the death of the Mayor. The Court of Appeals held that the statute is constitutional, reasoning that the automatic succession is not an ‘appointment’ to fill a vacancy but rather a pre-determined devolution of power, and thus does not trigger the constitutional requirement for a special election. This decision maintains governmental continuity and respects the electorate’s prior choice of the successor.
Facts
Erastus Corning, 2nd, the Mayor of Albany, died on May 28, 1983.
Pursuant to New York General City Law § 2-a, the President of the Common Council automatically succeeded to the office of Mayor for the remainder of the term.
The City Clerk of Albany believed that a special election was required under the New York State Constitution due to the ‘vacancy’ in the Mayor’s office.
The Albany County Board of Elections refused to schedule a special election.
Procedural History
The City Clerk initiated a mandamus proceeding to compel the Board of Elections to hold a special election.
Special Term treated the case as a declaratory judgment action and ruled that General City Law § 2-a was constitutional, and no special election was required.
The City Clerk appealed directly to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether New York General City Law § 2-a, providing for automatic succession to the office of Mayor, violates Article XIII, § 3 of the New York State Constitution, which governs filling vacancies in elective offices and limits the terms of appointed officials.
Holding
No, because the constitutional provision regarding vacancies in office applies only to ‘appointments,’ which are distinct from the automatic devolution of power to a successor already chosen by election.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that the constitutional provision regarding filling vacancies applies to situations where someone is ‘appointed’ to fill a vacant office. General City Law § 2-a, however, does not involve an appointment. Instead, it provides for the automatic transfer of power to an individual (the President of the Common Council) who has already been elected by the people.
The court emphasized the distinction between ‘appointment’ and ‘election,’ stating that “[t]he differentiation between appointment and election of public officers is evident and of very great political and practical significance. The constitutional provision imposes a restriction on the term of office only of persons appointed to office. By contrast the statutory provisions address the powers and duties of elective offices.”
The statute’s purpose is to ensure the continuous functioning of city government by preventing a vacancy in the Mayor’s office. The Court stated, “The design of the statute is calculated to obviate a void and thus the possibility of any paralysis of municipal executive authority, however brief, which would attend the necessity for independent action to accomplish replacement.”
The Court noted that when voters elected the President of the Common Council, they were implicitly choosing someone who could succeed to the Mayor’s office, ensuring that the successor has “the imprimatur of the electorate.”
The Court also clarified that the legislature’s power to enact General City Law § 2-a stems from the constitutional grant of legislative power, not from any delegation under the constitutional provision regarding vacancies.