People v. Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d 194 (1983)
A trial court lacks the inherent or statutory authority to dismiss a misdemeanor complaint for “failure to prosecute” or “calendar control” when the statutory speedy trial time has not elapsed; the power to dismiss is governed exclusively by statute.
Summary
This case addresses whether a trial court can dismiss a misdemeanor complaint based on the prosecution’s failure to convert the complaint into an information within a court-determined timeframe, absent a speedy trial violation. The Court of Appeals held that trial courts do not have the inherent or statutory authority to dismiss criminal charges for “failure to prosecute” or “calendar control.” The court emphasized that the power to dismiss is governed by statute (CPL 170.30), which exhaustively lists grounds for dismissal, and these grounds do not include failure to prosecute. While trial courts have calendar control powers, these do not extend to dismissing cases outside statutory grounds. The court reversed the Appellate Term’s orders and reinstated the complaints.
Facts
Several defendants were arrested and charged with various misdemeanors. In each case, the prosecutor failed to convert the misdemeanor complaint into an information (by obtaining supporting depositions) within a timeframe set by the trial court. The statutory speedy trial period (CPL 30.30) had not yet elapsed in any of the cases.
Procedural History
In each case, the New York City Criminal Court dismissed the charges due to the prosecutor’s failure to timely convert the complaint into an information. The Appellate Term affirmed the dismissals, holding that the trial courts acted within their discretion to control their calendars and address the prosecutor’s unpreparedness. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
- Whether trial courts have the inherent power to dismiss misdemeanor complaints for “failure to prosecute” or “calendar control” when the statutory speedy trial time has not elapsed.
Holding
- No, because neither common law nor statute grants trial courts the authority to dismiss criminal charges for failure to prosecute or calendar control; the grounds for dismissal are exhaustively listed in CPL 170.30, and these grounds do not include failure to prosecute or calendar control.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals stated that the lower courts had no authority to dismiss the charges for “failure to prosecute” or for “calendar control.” The court analyzed the historical development of the power to dismiss criminal charges, noting that at common law, only the Attorney General (later the District Attorney with court approval) could discontinue a criminal proceeding by entering a nolle prosequi. The court emphasized that it was the fear of prosecutors dismissing too many cases that prompted the Legislature to authorize courts to intercede, granting them a veto power but not a positive power to compel a discontinuance. The court noted that prior to the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1881, there was no inherent power vested in the courts to dismiss a criminal prosecution for “failure to prosecute”.
The court emphasized that CPL 170.30 comprehensively lists the grounds for dismissing a misdemeanor complaint, and “failure to prosecute” or “calendar control” are not among them. To allow dismissals on these grounds would be an “abdication of the judiciary’s responsibility to safeguard the public and promote respect for the law” and would create dismissals “incapable of meaningful appellate review.”
The court distinguished cases cited by the defendants, such as People v. Wingard, noting that those cases involved dismissals in the interest of justice pursuant to CPL 170.40 or other statutorily authorized dismissals. The court stated, “Thus, it is not for the trial courts to depart from the clear wording of CPL 170.30 and adopt, ipse dixit, a rule which empowers them to dismiss criminal proceedings on grounds, such as “failure to prosecute” and “calendar control”, which the Legislature never authorized.” The court concluded that the dismissals were unauthorized and unnecessary.