Antone v. General Motors Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 930 (1985)
When New York’s borrowing statute (CPLR 202) is invoked to apply a foreign state’s statute of limitations, the foreign state’s tolling provisions are also borrowed, and a defendant asserting the foreign statute bears the burden of proving they were present in that state to avoid the tolling provision.
Summary
This case addresses the application of New York’s borrowing statute when a plaintiff seeks to enforce a judgment obtained in another state. The Court of Appeals held that when New York borrows a foreign statute of limitations, it also borrows the foreign state’s tolling provisions. Furthermore, a defendant who claims the benefit of the foreign statute of limitations, while admitting non-residency in that state, bears the burden of proving their presence in the foreign jurisdiction to demonstrate that the statute was not tolled. This decision clarifies the procedural aspects of applying foreign statutes of limitations in New York courts.
Facts
The plaintiff, an Alabama resident, obtained a judgment in Alabama against a dissolved Delaware corporation. The plaintiff then sued the former officers of the corporation, who were New York residents, in New York to enforce the Alabama judgment.
Procedural History
The defendants moved to dismiss the action as untimely under Alabama law, invoking New York’s borrowing statute (CPLR 202). The lower court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendants failed to establish a prima facie defense that the action was time-barred.
Issue(s)
Whether, when New York’s borrowing statute (CPLR 202) is invoked to apply a foreign state’s statute of limitations, the foreign state’s tolling provisions are also borrowed, and whether the defendant bears the burden of proving presence in the foreign state to avoid the tolling provision.
Holding
Yes, because in borrowing the Alabama Statute of Limitations, its tolling statute is also borrowed. Further, the defendants failed to provide evidence that they were in Alabama after the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued; therefore, they did not establish a prima facie defense that the action was time-barred.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that when New York borrows a foreign statute of limitations, it must also borrow the foreign state’s tolling provisions. This principle is rooted in the idea that the entire statutory scheme of the foreign jurisdiction should be applied consistently. The court cited Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N.Y. 326 (1920), and Klotz v. Angle, 220 N.Y. 347 (1917), to support this proposition.
The Court emphasized that a defendant who concedes non-residency in the foreign jurisdiction has the burden of proving their presence there to avoid the tolling statute. The Court stated, “A defendant who concedes nonresidency in New York is presumed to have been absent from the State and, therefore, is required to prove his or her presence here in order to avoid New York’s tolling statute (CPLR 207) and obtain the protection of New York’s Statutes of Limitation (Beresovksi v Warszawski, 28 NY2d 419, 422, 425-426).” This presumption and burden of proof are considered procedural matters governed by the law of the forum (New York). The Court cited Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34 (1961), to underscore that procedural matters are governed by the law of the forum.
In this case, the defendants admitted residency in New York and failed to provide evidence of their presence in Alabama after the cause of action accrued. Therefore, they did not meet their burden of establishing a prima facie defense that the action was time-barred under Alabama law. The Court concluded that it was inappropriate to dismiss the complaint on this ground.