Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261 (1984)

In a strict products liability action based on design defect, the product’s reasonable safety is determined by balancing its risks against its utility, costs, and available alternatives, considering what a reasonable person with knowledge of potential injury would conclude at the time of marketing.

Summary

This case addresses the admissibility of post-manufacture evidence in a strict products liability action based on design defect. Astor Cover was severely injured when a 1973 Chevrolet Malibu, driven by Irving Cohen, accelerated uncontrollably and pinned him against a wall. Cover sued Cohen, the car dealer (Kinney Motors), and the manufacturer (General Motors). The trial court admitted evidence of a federal safety standard applicable to later model vehicles and a throttle spring removed after the accident. The jury found General Motors and Kinney Motors liable. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the post-manufacture safety standard was inadmissible and its admission was prejudicial. The court clarified the time of manufacture as the determinative date and articulated the rules for admitting evidence related to a manufacturer’s post-sale duty to warn.

Facts

Irving Cohen’s 1973 Chevrolet Malibu accelerated uncontrollably while he was attempting to park, striking and severely injuring Astor Cover. The car had been driven 12,000 miles without prior issues. Cover sued Cohen, Kinney Motors (the dealer), and General Motors (the manufacturer), alleging negligence and strict products liability based on a defective throttle return spring.

Procedural History

The trial court bifurcated the trial, addressing liability first. The jury found Cohen negligent, General Motors negligent and strictly liable, and Kinney Motors strictly liable. The trial court granted Kinney’s motion for indemnification against General Motors. The Appellate Division affirmed, reducing the damages. General Motors appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave. Kinney did not appeal but filed a brief arguing its liability was dependent on General Motors’.

Issue(s)

1. Whether evidence of a Federal motor vehicle safety standard, which postdated the manufacture of the car, is admissible in a strict products liability action based on design defect.
2. Whether a throttle spring removed from the vehicle 15 months after the accident is admissible as evidence.
3. Whether a statement made by the driver to a police officer shortly after the accident is admissible as evidence.
4. Whether a technical service bulletin issued after the sale of the vehicle is admissible as evidence.

Holding

1. No, because data not available at the time of manufacture is generally inadmissible, with limited exceptions for feasibility or a continuing duty to warn.
2. No, because absent proper foundation testimony, both the spring and its condition at the time of removal were irrelevant and inadmissible.
3. No, because the driver’s statement was exculpatory rather than inculpatory and thus did not qualify as a declaration against interest, and no other hearsay exception applied.
4. Yes, if properly related to the alleged defect and relevant to a cause of action for negligent failure to warn.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that evidence of post-manufacture modifications is inadmissible to establish fault in a strict products liability case based on design defect, although it may be admissible to establish feasibility. Because feasibility was conceded, the evidence concerning the federal motor vehicle safety standard was inadmissible and prejudicial. The court stated, “The issue before the jury was whether upon delivery to Irving Cohen in December, 1972 of his 1973 Malibu with the spring then in use by General Motors the car was reasonably safe in design.” The court further reasoned that the spring removed 15 months after the accident lacked foundation and was irrelevant. The driver’s statement to the police was inadmissible hearsay, as it was exculpatory and not a declaration against interest. The technical service bulletin, however, could be admissible on the issue of negligent failure to warn if a duty to warn existed. The court outlined the factors for determining the existence and scope of the post-sale duty to warn, including the degree of danger, the number of reported instances, and the burden on the manufacturer to provide a warning. The court reversed the order and granted a new trial as to both General Motors and Kinney, noting that full relief to the appealing party (General Motors) may necessitate relief to a non-appealing party (Kinney).