People v. Jones, 61 N.Y.2d 868 (1984)

When a co-defendant’s extrajudicial statement contains incriminating references to another defendant, its admission in a joint trial violates the non-confessing defendant’s right to confrontation, unless effectively redacted to eliminate any jury interpretation that incriminates the non-confessing defendant.

Summary

Jones was convicted of second-degree murder in a joint trial with his brother. The brother’s pre-trial statement implicated Jones in the robbery leading to the victim’s death. Jones moved to sever his trial, arguing that admitting the confession violated his right to confront the declarant. The trial court denied the motion, deeming the confession sufficiently redacted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the redacted statement still incriminated Jones because it referred to another participant, and given that the brothers were being tried together, the jury would likely interpret the references as pertaining to Jones. The court held that the admission of the confession was prejudicial error.

Facts

1. Jones and his brother were jointly tried for second-degree murder.
2. The brother made a pre-trial statement implicating Jones in the robbery that resulted in the victim’s death.
3. In the redacted statement, references to Jones by name were removed; however, the statement contained references to another participant in the crime.
4. Examples of such references included: “We got to the track”; “I said [deletion] let’s watch the cashiers window to see if somebody made a big hit and we will roll them”; and “we did not talk about the shooting that night”.

Procedural History

1. The trial court denied Jones’ motion to sever his trial from his brother’s.
2. Jones was convicted.
3. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
4. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded the matter for a new trial.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the admission of the co-defendant’s redacted statement, which contained references to another participant in the crime, violated Jones’ right to confrontation.
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Jones’ motion to sever his trial from that of his brother.

Holding

1. Yes, because given that the two brothers were being tried for the crime together, the confession could only be read by the jury as inculpating defendant.
2. Yes, because the co-defendant’s statement was not admissible on the joint trial, and defendant’s application to sever his trial should have been granted.

Court’s Reasoning

The court relied on Bruton v. United States, holding that admitting a co-defendant’s extrajudicial statement incriminating another defendant in a joint trial violates the non-confessing defendant’s right to confrontation, unless the co-defendant testifies. The court acknowledged that a confession can be admitted if effectively redacted so that the jury would not interpret its admissions as incriminating the non-confessing defendant (People v. Smalls; People v. Boone). The burden of effective redaction is on the prosecution.

The Court of Appeals rejected the People’s argument that the jury might have viewed the references to another participant as referring to a third, uncharged individual. The court stated, “The possibility that the jury may have viewed the incriminating references in this manner is insufficient to eliminate the prejudice to defendant from the use of this statement upon his trial. Given that the two brothers were being tried for the crime together, we believe the confession could only be read by the jury as inculpating defendant”.

The court concluded that admitting the statement was prejudicial error and that it could not say the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Jones was entitled to a new trial.