People v. Moses, 63 N.Y.2d 296 (1984)
A defendant’s false alibi, standing alone, is insufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the accomplice provides the only direct evidence on which the defendant was convicted.
Summary
Moses was convicted of felony murder and robbery based largely on the testimony of an accomplice, Baker. The prosecution presented evidence of Moses’s false alibi, a visit to Alexander’s, and presence at the crime scene hours before the incident. The trial court dismissed the indictment due to insufficient corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that a false alibi alone, without a direct connection to the crime, is insufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony under CPL 60.22.
Facts
Arthur Watt was robbed, stabbed, and strangled in a vacant apartment after meeting people at a bar. Lynette Baker, an accomplice, testified that Moses was involved. Baker said that Moses was present at the apartment building with Alston and Watt. She claimed Moses choked Watt while others robbed him. Moses, in a videotaped statement, claimed he was at home in the Bronx the entire evening and had never been to the abandoned building. Margaret Jennings saw Moses leaving the apartment building hours before the crime. Alston cashed Watt’s stolen travelers checks at Alexander’s.
Procedural History
Moses was convicted of felony murder and third-degree robbery in the trial court. The trial court granted Moses’s motion to dismiss the indictment after the verdict, finding Baker’s testimony inadequately corroborated. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order and reinstated the conviction, finding sufficient corroboration in Moses’s false alibi. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment.
Issue(s)
- Whether a defendant’s false alibi, standing alone, is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice under CPL 60.22.
Holding
- No, because the bare evidence of consciousness of guilt, in the circumstances of this case, was so inherently weak that it did not satisfy the corroboration requirement of CPL 60.22.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized that accomplice testimony is viewed with suspicion and requires corroboration under CPL 60.22. The corroborative evidence must come from an independent source and connect the defendant to the crime to reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth. The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that Moses’s visit to Alexander’s or his presence at the apartment hours before the crime provided sufficient corroboration. Regarding the Alexander’s visit, the court found that the evidence did not firmly establish Moses’s presence there on the day the checks were cashed or that he was with Alston. His presence at the apartment hours before the crime did not connect him to the criminal enterprise. The court acknowledged that a false alibi can indicate consciousness of guilt, but it is inherently weak evidence. “While such evidence may corroborate the testimony of an accomplice (People v Leyra, 1 NY2d 199, 208, supra), even in corroboration cases the court has found some nexus between the defendant and the criminal activity apart from the bare evidence of consciousness of guilt.” The court distinguished People v. Deitsch, where the defendant’s false denial was coupled with their presence at the scene moments before the crime. Here, there was no independent evidence linking Moses’s earlier presence at the apartment to the crime. The court concluded that the false alibi, without any direct connection to the crime itself, was insufficient corroboration.