64 N.Y.2d 20 (1984)
For the purpose of New York’s borrowing statute (CPLR 202), ‘residence’ is not equivalent to ‘domicile’; instead, it requires a significant connection to a locality within the state through living there for a substantial period during the year.
Summary
Samuel Antone sued General Motors (GM) for injuries sustained in a car accident in Pennsylvania, alleging negligence and strict liability. GM moved for summary judgment, arguing the suit was time-barred under New York’s borrowing statute (CPLR 202) because Antone was not a New York resident when the cause of action accrued in Pennsylvania, which has a two-year statute of limitations. The New York Court of Appeals held that ‘residence’ under CPLR 202 is distinct from ‘domicile’ and requires a significant connection to a New York locality. Because Antone was not a New York resident at the time of the accident, the Pennsylvania statute of limitations applied, barring his claim.
Facts
Antone, while employed at a nursing home in Rossiter, Pennsylvania, was injured in a one-car accident on September 12, 1977. He had moved to Pennsylvania from Olean, New York, in May 1977. Prior to living in Olean he had lived in Jamestown, New York. At the time of the accident, he maintained a post office box in Jamestown, New York, but had no place of residence in New York. In June 1980, Antone received a recall letter from GM regarding his 1975 Buick Skyhawk due to potential wheel-bearing problems. He commenced the lawsuit against GM on August 27, 1980.
Procedural History
Antone filed suit in New York. The trial court held a hearing and found that Antone failed to prove he was a resident of New York at the time of the accident. Special Term granted GM’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision without opinion. Antone appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the term ‘resident’ in CPLR 202 is equivalent to ‘domiciliary,’ such that Antone, who claimed to be domiciled in New York, could take advantage of New York’s statute of limitations despite the cause of action accruing outside the state.
Holding
No, because ‘resident’ as used in CPLR 202 is not synonymous with ‘domiciliary’; it requires a substantial connection to a locality within New York demonstrated by living there for a meaningful period during the year.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that New York law has long distinguished between ‘residence’ and ‘domicile,’ noting that a person can have multiple residences but only one domicile. The legislative history of CPLR 202 shows no intent to equate ‘resident’ with ‘domiciliary.’ The purpose of CPLR 202, which is to prevent forum shopping by non-residents, is better served by focusing on whether a plaintiff has a substantial connection to New York. If ‘resident’ were interpreted as ‘domiciliary,’ an individual with significant contacts in New York might unfairly be treated the same as someone with no New York connections. The court found Antone’s action time-barred because he was not a New York resident at the time of the accident, and the Pennsylvania statute of limitations was two years, which had already expired. The court rejected Antone’s arguments that GM should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations or that he should be allowed to amend his complaint to add a cause of action for fraudulent concealment, finding no evidence to support these claims. As the court stated, “the determination of whether a plaintiff is a New York resident, for purposes of CPLR 202, turns on whether he has a significant connection with some locality in the State as the result of living there for some length of time during the course of a year”.