65 N.Y.2d 224 (1985)
The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy does not bar the prosecution from seeking enhanced sentencing for repeat offenders, even if they failed to prove prior convictions in an earlier sentencing hearing.
Summary
Sailor was convicted of robbery. The prosecution initially sought to sentence him as a persistent felony offender, but failed to prove his prior convictions. Subsequently, the prosecution sought to sentence him as a second felony offender based on the same prior convictions. The New York Court of Appeals held that double jeopardy protections do not apply to enhanced sentencing proceedings under New York law. The court reasoned that enhanced sentencing relates to a defendant’s prior criminal record and is distinct from the underlying substantive offense. The court also emphasized the discretion afforded to the sentencing judge and the procedural differences between capital sentencing and enhanced sentencing.
Facts
Sailor was convicted of offenses stemming from a 1978 bank robbery.
In a persistent felony offender hearing, Sailor initially admitted to prior Florida convictions but later denied being the same person as the subject of those convictions (Leroy Cooper).
The prosecution’s evidence of identity (FBI rap sheet, transcript of prior hearing) was deemed inadmissible hearsay.
The court found the prosecution failed to prove Sailor was a persistent felony offender.
The prosecution then filed a predicate felony conviction statement to have Sailor sentenced as a second felony offender based on the same Florida convictions.
Procedural History
The County Court initially determined Sailor was a persistent felony offender, but the Appellate Division vacated the sentence due to lack of prior notice and remitted the matter for resentencing.
On remittal, the County Court found the prosecution failed to prove Sailor was a persistent felony offender.
The County Court then found Sailor to be a second felony offender, which Sailor appealed.
The Appellate Division affirmed the second felony offender sentence, and Sailor appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the prosecution from seeking a second felony offender sentence based on convictions they failed to prove at a prior persistent felony offender hearing.
2. Whether collateral estoppel precludes the prosecution from relitigating Sailor’s identity as the person subject to the prior Florida convictions.
3. Whether Sailor’s 1969 Florida conviction for attempted robbery is equivalent to a New York felony and a proper predicate for a second felony offender sentence.
Holding
1. No, because the protections embodied in the double jeopardy clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions do not apply to these enhanced sentencing proceedings required under New York’s second and persistent felony offender statutes.
2. No, because collateral estoppel should not preclude the prosecution from relitigating defendant’s prior felony convictions at the second felony offender hearing.
3. Yes, because Sailor’s conviction of attempted robbery in Florida was at least the equivalent of a conviction in New York of attempted robbery in the third degree, a class E felony.
Court’s Reasoning
The court first addressed the collateral estoppel claim, finding several reasons why it should not apply:
There was no final judgment rendered in the prior hearing.
The prosecution could not appeal the discretionary persistent felony offender determination.
The prosecution did not receive a full and fair adjudication because the court erroneously excluded evidence of Sailor’s judicial admission.
The court then distinguished the Supreme Court cases of "Bullington v. Missouri" and "Arizona v. Rumsey", which applied double jeopardy to capital sentencing, arguing that those cases involved the death penalty which is an integral part of the substantive offense of capital murder. In contrast, New York’s persistent felony offender and second felony offender statutes are concerned solely with a defendant’s prior criminal record.
The court emphasized that classification as a persistent felony offender or second felony offender is not a separate offense and does not change the class of the underlying conviction. The court pointed out that the death penalty, unlike enhanced sentences, carries a unique sense of finality and anxiety for the defendant.
The court also noted the significant discretion retained by the sentencing judge in New York, distinguishing it from the more limited discretion in the capital sentencing cases.
Finally, the court rejected Sailor’s argument that his Florida conviction was not equivalent to a New York felony, concluding that it was at least equivalent to attempted robbery in the third degree, a Class E felony.
“The defendant’s primary concern and anxiety obviously relate to the determination of innocence or guilt, and that already is behind him.”