59 N.Y.2d 137 (1983)
In paternity proceedings, the trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility is given great weight, and a respondent’s refusal to testify allows the strongest inferences against him, provided those inferences are supported by the opposing evidence.
Summary
This case concerns a paternity dispute. The Commissioner of Social Services, on behalf of the petitioner, initiated proceedings to establish the respondent as the father of her child. Conflicting evidence existed regarding the date of conception. The petitioner had intercourse with the respondent on November 14, 1981, but also admitted to intercourse with another man on October 9, 1981. She testified to a normal menstrual period between November 1-5, 1981. Medical testimony indicated the child was born prematurely, approximately four weeks early. The respondent did not testify. The Family Court found the respondent to be the father. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Family Court order. The Court emphasized the trial judge’s role in assessing credibility and the negative inference drawn from the respondent’s silence in the face of opposing evidence.
Facts
On July 9, 1982, the petitioner gave birth to a child out of wedlock. The attending physician testified the child was born approximately four weeks prematurely, setting the expected birth date around August 4, 1982. Hospital records supported the premature birth. The petitioner testified she first had intercourse with the respondent on November 14, 1981. She also admitted to having intercourse with another individual on October 9, 1981. She testified that her last normal menstrual period occurred between November 1 and November 5, 1981. The respondent chose not to testify at trial.
Procedural History
The Commissioner of Social Services initiated the paternity proceeding in Family Court. The Family Court adjudicated the respondent as the father. The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court’s decision. The Commissioner of Social Services appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Family Court’s original determination.
Issue(s)
Whether the Family Court’s determination that the respondent was the father of the child was supported by clear and convincing evidence, considering the conflicting dates of possible conception and the respondent’s refusal to testify.
Holding
Yes, because the trial judge’s assessment of the petitioner’s credibility, along with the medical testimony regarding prematurity and the negative inference drawn from the respondent’s refusal to testify, provided clear and convincing evidence to support the Family Court’s finding.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized the significant weight given to the trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility. The Court noted the rule that a respondent’s refusal to testify in a paternity proceeding allows the strongest inferences against him, provided that the opposing evidence permits such inferences. The court cited Noce v. Kaufman, 2 N.Y.2d 347 and Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. [Patricia A.] v. Philip De G., 59 NY2d 137 in support. The court reasoned that the combination of the petitioner’s testimony regarding her menstrual cycle, the medical testimony confirming the child’s premature birth, and the respondent’s silence, supported the Family Court’s conclusion. The court highlighted that the medical testimony placed the date of intercourse with the respondent within an accepted gestational period. Because the respondent did not testify to offer an alternative explanation or to contradict the petitioner’s testimony, the court found that the Family Court’s conclusion was supported by the evidence. The court implicitly applied a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test to determine whether clear and convincing evidence existed, giving substantial deference to the lower court’s findings. The Court’s reasoning underscores the importance of a party’s decision to testify or remain silent, particularly when faced with adverse evidence. It also clarifies that while negative inferences are permissible, they must be grounded in and supported by the other evidence presented.