66 N.Y.2d 216 (1985)

A defendant forfeits the right to challenge a statutory previous prosecution claim under CPL 40.20 by pleading guilty, even if the claim was raised before the plea, but a constitutional double jeopardy claim survives a guilty plea if the charge, on its face, is one that the State may not constitutionally prosecute.

Summary

Veronica Prescott pleaded guilty to attempted robbery after her motion to dismiss the indictment based on a prior prosecution for criminal possession of stolen property was partially denied. The New York Court of Appeals held that Prescott forfeited her statutory double jeopardy claim under CPL 40.20 by pleading guilty. While a constitutional double jeopardy claim survives a guilty plea, the court found that Prescott’s constitutional rights were not violated because robbery and criminal possession of stolen property are distinct offenses requiring proof of different elements. The court emphasized the importance of finality in criminal cases and preventing defendants from benefiting from plea bargains while avoiding admission of guilt.

Facts

Lillian Hasten and another woman were robbed in a shopping mall parking lot on July 30, 1979. Later that day, Prescott attempted to use Hasten’s stolen credit card at a department store. Store security detained Prescott, and Hasten’s husband, a police officer, found stolen property in Prescott’s car.

Procedural History

1. July 3, 1979: Prescott was charged with fraud, larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, forgery, and criminal impersonation based on the department store incident.
2. September 6, 1979: Prescott pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in satisfaction of the store charges.
3. November 2, 1979: Prescott was indicted for robbery and criminal possession of stolen property related to the mall robbery.
4. Prescott moved to dismiss the indictment under CPL 40.20; the motion was granted in part for the criminal possession counts but denied for the robbery count.
5. Prescott pleaded guilty to attempted robbery in the second degree.
6. The Appellate Division affirmed the robbery conviction, holding that Prescott waived her CPL 40.20 claim by pleading guilty.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a defendant forfeits a statutory claim under CPL 40.20 to be free from further prosecution by pleading guilty, even if the claim was presented to the court prior to the plea.
2. Whether a prosecution for robbery in the second degree, following a conviction for criminal possession of stolen property, violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Holding

1. Yes, because a guilty plea represents a compromise meant to end a criminal case, and allowing the statutory claim to survive would undermine the finality of the plea bargain.
2. No, because robbery and criminal possession of stolen property are distinct offenses, each requiring proof of an element that the other does not.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that a guilty plea is a bargain that should bring finality to a criminal case. Allowing a statutory double jeopardy claim to survive the plea would undermine this principle. The court stated that “the plea both waives certain rights attendant to trial and forfeits rights to renew arguments made before a plea is accepted.” It distinguished constitutional rights, which can survive a guilty plea under Menna v. New York, from statutory rights, which are forfeited “when the statute would confer on the defendant greater rights than the Constitution demands.”

Regarding the constitutional double jeopardy claim, the court applied the Blockburger test, which asks whether each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not. The court explained, “The test for determining whether two offenses are the same within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause is whether two distinct statutory provisions each requires proof of a fact that the other does not.” It found that robbery requires proof of forcible stealing, while criminal possession requires proof of possession of stolen property with intent to benefit or impede recovery by the owner. Because each offense has a distinct element, the court held that Prescott’s constitutional right against double jeopardy was not violated.

The court contrasted this case with situations where a specific statutory offense is always a necessary element of a separately charged offense, which would violate double jeopardy principles, citing Illinois v. Vitale. The court observed that this was not the case here. It was noted that concerns about statutory and constitutional double jeopardy violations could be addressed prior to trial by means of an Article 78 proceeding.