63 N.Y.2d 834 (1984)

Once the prosecution establishes a prima facie case of conspiracy, statements of a co-conspirator made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against the defendant to bolster other evidence of the defendant’s membership in the conspiracy.

Summary

Defendant Bracetty was convicted of conspiracy in the fifth degree for arranging a meeting between an undercover officer and a dealer in illegal licenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy through the defendant’s own statements. Once this threshold was met, the statements of the co-conspirator (the dealer) were properly admitted to bolster the proof of the defendant’s involvement. The court also rejected the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in not charging the jury on entrapment, finding no evidence that the defendant was actively induced or lacked predisposition to commit the crime.

Facts

An undercover officer met with the defendant. The defendant arranged a meeting between the officer and a dealer in illegal licenses. The defendant’s statements to the undercover officer indicated his familiarity with the illegal license scheme and an expectation of payment for his referral. The dealer made statements that implicated the defendant in the conspiracy.

Procedural History

The defendant was convicted of conspiracy in the fifth degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted review and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy, thereby allowing the admission of co-conspirator statements.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not charging the jury on entrapment.

Holding

1. Yes, because the defendant’s own statements to the undercover officer established a prima facie case that the defendant arranged a meeting with a dealer in illegal licenses, showing an illicit agreement, the defendant’s familiarity with the workings of it, and the defendant’s intent to be paid.

2. No, because the defendant was not actively induced to engage in criminal activity, nor was any evidence presented suggesting that the defendant had no predisposition to commit this crime.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the introduction of the defendant’s statements to the undercover officer provided a sufficient basis for a prima facie case of conspiracy. The court cited precedent holding that once a prima facie case is established, the statements of a co-conspirator are admissible to bolster other proof of the defendant’s membership in the conspiracy. The court referenced People v. Ardito, People v. Sanders, People v. Berkowitz, and People v. Salko to support this rule. The court emphasized that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, was sufficient to submit the conspiracy charge to the jury. The court found no evidence supporting an entrapment defense, stating that “[t]he defendant was neither actively induced to engage in criminal activity… nor was any evidence presented suggesting that the defendant had no predisposition to commit this crime.” The absence of inducement or lack of predisposition negated the need for an entrapment charge. This case underscores the evidentiary principle that co-conspirator statements are admissible once an independent basis for the conspiracy has been shown, and it clarifies the circumstances under which an entrapment charge is warranted.