66 N.Y.2d 523 (1986)
Adjournments requested by the defendant are excluded when calculating the People’s readiness for trial under CPL 30.30, even if the People knew or should have known earlier of facts that led to a more serious charge.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the indictment against the defendant. The defendant was initially arraigned on misdemeanor charges but later indicted on a felony charge after the prosecution discovered a prior conviction. The trial court dismissed the indictment, concluding the prosecution wasn’t ready for trial within the time provided by CPL 30.30 because they should have known earlier of the prior conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s requested adjournments between the initial arraignment and the felony indictment must be excluded from the speedy trial calculation, making the prosecution’s actions timely. The court emphasized that the substance of the charges remained essentially unchanged.
Facts
Defendant was arraigned on June 2, 1983, on misdemeanor charges: driving under the influence, speeding, and failing to keep to the right.
Between June 2 and October 4, 1983, the defendant secured several adjournments to obtain counsel, make motions, and prepare for trial.
On October 4, 1983, the People discovered that the defendant had a prior DWI conviction within the past 10 years, which elevated the charge to a felony under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(5).
The People secured an adjournment to file a felony complaint.
Defendant was arraigned on the felony complaint on November 1, 1983, and indicted on February 8, 1984, for driving while intoxicated, speeding and failing to keep to the right side of the highway.
The People announced their readiness for trial on February 17, 1984.
Procedural History
The trial court dismissed the indictment, finding the People should have known of the prior conviction sooner and were not ready for trial within the statutory timeframe.
The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, stating the People failed to show the pre-indictment delay caused by the defendant impeded them from presenting the case to the Grand Jury. (115 AD2d 266).
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the indictment.
Issue(s)
Whether the adjournments requested by the defendant between the initial misdemeanor arraignment and the subsequent felony indictment should be excluded when calculating the People’s readiness for trial under CPL 30.30.
Holding
Yes, because defendant’s requested adjournments in the period between June 2 and October 4 must be excluded in determining the People’s compliance with CPL 30.30 (CPL 30.30 [4] [b], [f]), thus bringing the period in issue here within statutory requirements.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 30.30(4)(b) and (f) explicitly exclude periods of delay resulting from adjournments requested by the defendant when calculating the People’s readiness for trial. The court emphasized that the People don’t need to prove that the defendant’s actions directly caused their lack of readiness when the delay is due to the defendant’s requests. The court stated, “Where adjournments are allowed at defendant’s request, those periods of delay are expressly waived in calculating the People’s trial readiness, without the need for the People to trace their lack of readiness to defendant’s actions.” The court found that the charges against the defendant remained essentially unchanged, despite the upgrade to a felony. The fact that the People knew or should have known of the prior conviction earlier did not alter the application of the speedy trial rules. This case underscores that defendants cannot benefit from delays they themselves requested in speedy trial calculations. This decision reinforces the principle that a defendant’s actions contributing to pre-trial delay will be attributed to them, even if the prosecution could have acted faster. The Court distinguished this case from situations where the prosecution’s delay is unrelated to the defendant’s actions, emphasizing that the defendant actively sought the adjournments in question. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.