People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514 (1987)
When the prosecution’s case for criminal possession of a weapon relies solely on the statutory presumption of possession arising from the defendant’s presence in a vehicle where the weapon was found, the defendant has standing to challenge the legality of both the stop of the vehicle and the search that uncovered the weapon.
Summary
Millan was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon based solely on the statutory presumption arising from his presence in a taxi where a gun was found. He moved to suppress the weapon, arguing the stop and search were illegal. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, finding Millan lacked standing. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when the prosecution’s case hinges on the statutory presumption, the defendant has standing to challenge the legality of the stop and search. Denying the defendant this right would violate fundamental fairness.
Facts
Millan and two companions were passengers in a taxi. Plainclothes officers in an unmarked taxi directed Millan’s taxi to pull over. The officers ordered the occupants out and searched them and the taxi’s passenger compartment without consent. A gun was found in a black leather bag on the back seat. The prosecutor stated the police stopped the cab because the occupants made “suspicious moves”. Millan was charged with criminal possession of a weapon based on Penal Law § 265.15(3), which presumes possession by all occupants of a vehicle where a firearm is found.
Procedural History
Millan moved to suppress the weapon, arguing the stop and search were illegal. The suppression court denied the motion without a hearing. Millan was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether a defendant, charged with criminal possession of a weapon based solely on the statutory presumption arising from their presence in a vehicle where the weapon was found, has standing to challenge the legality of the search of the vehicle.
2. Whether a passenger in a vehicle has standing to challenge the legality of the stop of that vehicle.
Holding
1. Yes, because the People cannot rely on the statutory presumption to establish constructive possession and simultaneously deny the defendant the right to challenge the search that yielded the evidence supporting that presumption.
2. Yes, because a passenger has a right to be free from unreasonable seizures, and an unlawful stop constitutes such a seizure.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the People’s reliance solely on the statutory presumption to establish Millan’s guilt of constructive possession gave him standing to challenge the search. Citing People v. Mosley, the court stated that when the prosecution relies on the discovery of evidence to establish constructive possession, the defendant has standing to contest the legality of the search that produced that evidence. The court distinguished People v. Ponder, which eliminated “automatic standing,” because Millan’s claim was not based on a right to possess the gun or on the mere accusation of a possessory crime, but on the circumstances giving rise to the presumption.
The court emphasized the unfairness of allowing the government to use the legal fiction of constructive possession to prosecute passengers while denying them the right to challenge the search. It stated that such a rule offends fundamental tenets of fairness inherent in New York criminal jurisprudence.
The court further held that Millan had standing to challenge the stop of the taxi, regardless of the legality of the search. An illegal stop constitutes an unlawful seizure, and a passenger has a right to be free from such seizures. The court found that the stop, search, and discovery of the gun were part of a continuous chain of events, and there was no evidence that the taint of the allegedly improper stop had been attenuated. Quoting Wong Sun v. United States, the court stated that the gun was “‘come at by exploitation of that illegality’” and should be suppressed if the stop was unlawful.
The court concluded that the moving papers were sufficient to warrant a hearing, and any objection to their sufficiency was waived by the suppression court. The court modified the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the case for a suppression hearing.