People v. Lomax, 72 N.Y.2d 820 (1988)
When calculating the time within which the People must be ready for trial under CPL 30.30, the day the criminal action commenced is excluded from the computation.
Summary
This case addresses how to calculate the statutory speedy trial time under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 30.30. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s order, holding that when computing the time within which the People must be ready for trial, the day the criminal action commenced should be excluded. The Court relied on General Construction Law § 20, which provides a general rule for excluding the first day when computing a period of time from a specified event. The decision emphasizes that CPL 30.30 specifies the event that begins the running of the statutory period, triggering the application of General Construction Law § 20.
Facts
The specific facts of the underlying criminal case are not detailed in this memorandum opinion. The relevant fact is that the issue arose concerning the proper calculation of the time period under CPL 30.30, specifically whether the first day of the statutory period should be included or excluded.
Procedural History
The case originated in a lower court, where the defendant likely moved for dismissal based on a violation of CPL 30.30. The Appellate Term reversed, presumably finding no speedy trial violation. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Term’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether, in computing the time within which the People must be ready for trial under CPL 30.30, the day on which the criminal action commenced should be included or excluded from the computation.
Holding
Yes, the day on which the criminal action commenced should be excluded from the computation because the statute specifies an event that begins the running of the statutory period, thus requiring application of General Construction Law § 20.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals based its reasoning on two main points. First, it cited General Construction Law § 20, which states that “[i]n computing any specified period of time from a specified event, the day upon which the event happens is deemed the day from which the reckoning is made. The day from which any specified period of time is reckoned shall be excluded in making the reckoning.” The Court found this provision directly applicable to CPL 30.30 because CPL 30.30 specifies the event that starts the clock: “commencement of a criminal action.”
Second, the Court noted that excluding the first day has been the “accepted practice” in previous cases involving CPL 30.30, citing People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529 and People v. Sturgis, 38 N.Y.2d 625 as examples, even though the specific issue of first-day exclusion wasn’t explicitly litigated in those cases.
The Court distinguished its holding from the companion case, People ex rel. Neufeld v. McMickens, 70 N.Y.2d 763, explaining that the statute at issue in Neufeld (CPL 170.70) referred to “the period of actual custody” rather than measurement from a specified day or event, making the General Construction Law § 20 inapplicable. The court quoted Justice Gibbons’ dissent in Neufeld: “[the statute] does not refer to measurement from a specified day or event; it refers to the period of actual custody” (117 AD2d 243, 250).
This case underscores the importance of carefully examining the language of the statute in question to determine if it refers to a specific event triggering the application of General Construction Law § 20.