McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246 (1989)
A plaintiff must have some level of awareness to recover damages for loss of enjoyment of life; such damages are not recoverable by a plaintiff lacking awareness.
Summary
This case addresses whether a person in a persistent vegetative state can recover damages for loss of enjoyment of life. The New York Court of Appeals held that some level of awareness is a prerequisite to recovery for loss of enjoyment of life. The court reasoned that damages for loss of enjoyment of life are intended to compensate the plaintiff for the frustration and anguish caused by the inability to participate in activities that once brought pleasure, and without awareness, the plaintiff cannot experience this frustration. The decision also addressed the propriety of separate jury instructions for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, ultimately determining they should be merged to avoid double recovery.
Facts
Emma McDougald underwent a surgery performed by physicians Garber and Gursky. After the surgery, McDougald suffered severe brain damage and was left in a permanent vegetative state. While she retained some cognitive functions, she was not aware of her condition or surroundings. McDougald’s husband brought a medical malpractice action against the doctors, seeking damages for her injuries, including pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life.
Procedural History
The trial court instructed the jury to award damages for both pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life separately. The jury awarded McDougald $1,000,000 for loss of enjoyment of life and $3,500,000 for pain and suffering. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, holding that loss of enjoyment of life damages are not recoverable absent some level of awareness and ordered a new trial on nonpecuniary damages.
Issue(s)
- Whether a plaintiff must have some level of awareness to recover damages for loss of enjoyment of life?
- Whether the jury should be instructed to consider damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life separately?
Holding
- Yes, because to award damages for loss of enjoyment of life, the injured party must have some level of awareness to experience the loss.
- No, because instructing the jury to consider them separately may lead to a double recovery for the same injury.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that the purpose of compensatory damages is to make the injured party whole. For damages for loss of enjoyment of life to be truly compensatory, the injured party must be aware of the loss. Without awareness, the damages serve no compensatory purpose, as the injured party cannot appreciate or derive any benefit from them. The court stated, “We find it illogical to award damages to a person who cannot experience the satisfaction of those damages.” The court distinguished between pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, stating that while pain and suffering compensate for the physical and emotional distress caused by the injury, loss of enjoyment of life compensates for the limitations on the person’s life created by the injury. However, the court also recognized that the two types of damages are closely related and that instructing the jury to consider them separately could lead to a double recovery. “There is no reason to recognize loss of enjoyment of life as a separate category of damages apart from pain and suffering,” the court stated, noting the risk of juries improperly inflating damage awards.
Judge Titone, in dissent, argued that loss of enjoyment of life is an objective damage item, conceptually distinct from conscious pain and suffering. He asserted that the capacity to enjoy life is an essential attribute of a healthy individual, and the loss of that capacity is a serious impairment, regardless of the individual’s awareness of the loss. Titone found the majority’s requirement of “some level of awareness” arbitrary and unfair, as it denies recovery to those completely without cognitive capacity while permitting it for those with a mere spark of awareness. He believed that instructing the jury to differentiate between the objective and subjective elements of the plaintiff’s nonpecuniary loss would contribute to accuracy and precision in thought.