70 N.Y.2d 885 (1987)
An individual’s statement during Miranda advisements regarding the right to counsel must unequivocally invoke that right to trigger the cessation of questioning.
Summary
The defendant was convicted of burglary and robbery. He sought to suppress statements made to police, arguing violations of his Miranda and Payton rights. During Miranda advisements, he stated, “I have an attorney,” leading to a cessation of questioning. After further investigation, officers asked who his attorney was, and he recanted, stating, “I don’t have an attorney.” He then made incriminating statements after being re-advised of his Miranda rights. The lower courts found he did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower courts’ undisturbed findings were supported by the record and therefore beyond the scope of its review.
Facts
Defendant was arrested and given Miranda warnings.
During the advisement of his right to counsel, the defendant stated, “I have an attorney.”
All questioning ceased at that point.
After further investigation, police asked the defendant who his attorney was.
Defendant then stated, “I don’t have an attorney.” He explained he had called an attorney earlier to inquire about police obtaining his military record fingerprints but did not discuss the criminal investigation.
Defendant was re-advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently made incriminating statements.
Procedural History
The suppression court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements, finding that he did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel.
The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression court’s ruling.
The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the defendant unequivocally invoked his right to counsel during Miranda advisements when he stated, “I have an attorney,” such that any subsequent statements should be suppressed.
Holding
No, because the lower courts’ resolutions rested on undisturbed findings supported by the record, placing the issue beyond the scope of the Court of Appeals’ review. The initial statement was not deemed an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decisions based on the principle that factual findings, if undisturbed and supported by the record, are beyond the scope of appellate review in the Court of Appeals. The suppression court and Appellate Division had both found that the defendant’s statement, “I have an attorney,” did not constitute an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. This factual determination was critical because Miranda requires that questioning cease only when the suspect clearly asserts the right to an attorney. The court implicitly reasoned that allowing ambiguous or equivocal statements to trigger the Miranda protections would unduly hamper legitimate police investigations. The court noted that there was no Payton issue presented because the arrest occurred outside the defendant’s home. The court also dismissed the defendant’s other arguments as either unpreserved or without merit. The decision highlights the importance of clear and unambiguous invocation of rights during custodial interrogation; ambiguity will be construed against the defendant.