People v. Foster, 73 N.Y.2d 596 (1989)
Taking money pursuant to a default judgment, even if the judgment is later found to be jurisdictionally defective due to improper service, does not constitute larceny unless the defendants misrepresented the facts to the court.
Summary
Defendants, attorneys, obtained a default judgment against Prior for unpaid legal fees. Prior’s bank account was levied to satisfy the judgment. Prior had been part of a communal group and had lived at a group-owned apartment. She moved out, allegedly without informing the group of her new address and attempting to conceal it. The defendants served the summons at the group address, although service may have been improper. The People charged the attorneys with larceny, arguing they knew service was defective and the judgment was invalid. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the guilty verdict, holding that enforcing a default judgment, even if jurisdictionally flawed, does not automatically constitute larceny absent misrepresentation to the court.
Facts
Mia Prior was a member of a communal group for 10 years, during which time she received benefits, including legal assistance. Defendant Foster, also a member and an attorney, assisted her with legal issues related to her father. After her father’s death in 1984, Prior inherited a trust and decided to leave the group. A dispute arose over Foster’s legal fees. Prior moved out of the group’s apartment at 415 East 12th Street and allegedly concealed her new address. Foster, represented by codefendant Paolo, sued Prior for unpaid fees and served a summons at the East 12th Street address, claiming it was Prior’s “last known residence”. The service arguably violated CPLR 308(2). A default judgment was entered, and Prior’s bank account was levied for over $7,000.
Procedural History
The defendants were charged with grand larceny in the second degree. The trial court initially denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. A jury found the defendants guilty, but the trial court set aside the verdict, reasoning that the judgment was valid when executed. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the conviction, holding that obtaining a judgment with knowledge of improper service and intent to deprive property constitutes larceny. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether obtaining money pursuant to a default judgment, even if jurisdictionally defective due to improper service and the defendant’s knowledge of the defect, constitutes larceny.
Holding
No, because the defendants did not misrepresent the facts of service to the court when applying for the default judgment. The Court reasoned that merely obtaining a judgment known to be defective is not sufficient for a larceny conviction; there must be evidence of fraud or misrepresentation to the court.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court emphasized that the defendants did not misrepresent the facts of service to the court. While the affidavit of service contained the legal conclusion that service was “duly made,” the affidavits also disclosed that service was made at Prior’s “last known residence” and mailed to the same address, which, on its face, reveals a potential defect under CPLR 308(2). The court distinguished the case from others where defendants obtained court orders through forgery, perjury, or other factual misrepresentations. The Court acknowledged the People’s argument that taking money under a void order constitutes larceny under Penal Law § 155.05(1). However, the Court stated this section is not a “catchall” for acts not specifically prohibited by the Legislature. The Court cited the reluctance to elevate civil wrongs to criminal larceny, especially in business activities where intent is unclear. The Court noted the need for specific legislative action to criminalize such conduct, including safeguards against abuse. “Conduct which is wrongful in the civil context is not necessarily ‘wrongful’ within the meaning of the larceny statutes”. The Court emphasized that the Legislature has generally identified prohibited conduct quite specifically and provided some additional safeguard, such as the corroboration requirement for perjury. The Court concluded that the defendant’s conduct was not larceny as defined by the Legislature and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.