Matter of Cohen, 74 N.Y.2d 272 (1989)
r
r
A judge’s conduct in accepting preferential loan terms and directing infant settlement funds to a credit union where he received those benefits creates an appearance of impropriety and warrants removal from judicial office, even absent direct proof of corrupt intent.
r
r
Summary
r
Judge Jerome D. Cohen was found by the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct to have engaged in misconduct by accepting favorable loan terms from HYFIN Credit Union and directing settlements awarded to infants to be deposited there. This resulted in a personal financial benefit to Cohen. The Commission recommended his removal from office. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination, finding that Cohen’s actions created an appearance that his judicial decisions were influenced by personal gain, thus undermining public confidence in the judiciary. Even without proof of corrupt intent, the appearance of impropriety and the judge’s lack of candor justified removal.
r
r
Facts
r
Jerome Cohen served as a Civil Court Judge in New York City (1980-1984) and later as a Supreme Court Justice. While a Civil Court Judge, Cohen approved settlements for infants and directed the funds to be deposited in HYFIN Credit Union, where he had several personal loans. He received lower interest rates and, from 1980 to 1985, had all loan payments credited only to principal, resulting in substantial waived interest. As a Civil Court Judge, Cohen ordered deposits of $244,503.14 in infants’ funds to HYFIN in 56 cases. Edmund Lee, HYFIN’s treasurer, testified to an understanding that Cohen would receive favorable loan terms for directing deposits to HYFIN. Cohen denied any such understanding.
r
r
Procedural History
r
The Commission on Judicial Conduct filed a complaint against Cohen. A Referee held a hearing and found that Cohen obtained loans at favorable rates and knowingly received interest-free loans, but did not find sufficient evidence of an explicit “understanding” with HYFIN. The Commission confirmed the Referee’s report, sustained the charges, and recommended removal. Cohen sought review by the New York Court of Appeals.
r
r
Issue(s)
r
1. Whether the Commission’s finding that Judge Cohen knew he was receiving interest-free loans is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.r
2. Whether the sanction of removal from judicial office is appropriate given the judge’s misconduct.
r
r
Holding
r
1. Yes, because the record demonstrates that the judge received preferential treatment on interest and received interest-free loans, and his explanations were unconvincing.r
2. Yes, because the judge’s actions created an appearance of impropriety, undermined public confidence in the judiciary, and demonstrated a lack of judicial temperament.
r
r
Court’s Reasoning
r
The Court of Appeals found ample evidence that Cohen knowingly obtained loans at favorable rates not available to others, violating judicial conduct rules. The court rejected Cohen’s claim that he was unaware he was receiving interest-free loans, noting that his loan payments were marked “personal and confidential,” requiring intervention to override automatic interest crediting. The court found Cohen’s explanations regarding his tax returns and loan statements unconvincing. The court emphasized that Cohen not only received preferential interest rates but also interest-free loans for almost five years, saving him $15,000. The Court held that by using his office to benefit HYFIN, Cohen created the impression that his judicial decisions were influenced by personal profit motives, violating basic ethical standards. Quoting Matter of Sims, 61 NY2d 349, the court highlighted the importance of avoiding even the appearance that a judge’s decisions could be influenced by personal gain. The Court noted that while removal is a drastic sanction, it is warranted when a judge acts as if his decisions could be influenced by personal gain, thus removing the stain from the judiciary. The Court stated, “[s]uch an appearance diminishes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and destroys [petitioner’s] usefulness on the bench”. The Court emphasized that “Impartiality and integrity are among the most essential attributes for members of the judiciary.”