People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638 (1990)
The purposeful exclusion of jurors based on race by the defense, through peremptory challenges, violates both the Civil Rights Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the New York State Constitution.
Summary
Defendants were convicted of manslaughter and assault stemming from an attack on Black men. During jury selection, the defense used peremptory challenges to remove all Black jurors. The prosecution argued this was discriminatory. The New York Court of Appeals held that defense counsel’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors based on race violates the state constitution’s Civil Rights and Equal Protection Clauses. The court reasoned that jury service is a civil right and privilege of citizenship, and the State is inextricably involved in enforcing discriminatory decisions made during jury selection. This landmark case extends the Batson principle to defense attorneys in New York.
Facts
Michael Griffith, Cedric Sandiford, and Timothy Grimes, Black men, sought help after their car broke down in Howard Beach, Queens. A group of white teenagers, including defendants Kern, Lester, and Ladone, who had been at a birthday party, confronted and attacked the men. The incident escalated, with the attackers wielding bats and sticks, yelling racial slurs, and chasing the victims. Griffith, attempting to escape, ran onto the Belt Parkway, where he was struck by a car and killed. Sandiford was severely beaten. The defendants were arrested and indicted for manslaughter, assault, and conspiracy.
Procedural History
The defendants were convicted in Supreme Court, Queens County. During jury selection, the defense used peremptory challenges to remove Black jurors. The prosecution challenged this as discriminatory. The Supreme Court ruled that the defense could not exercise peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, applying the Batson v. Kentucky standard prospectively. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the State Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from exercising racially discriminatory peremptory challenges.
2. Whether the defense exercise of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges constitutes “State action” for equal protection purposes.
Holding
1. Yes, because purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges by the defense is prohibited by the Civil Rights Clause of Article I, § 11 of the State Constitution.
2. Yes, because the judicial enforcement of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges exercised by defense counsel constitutes “State action” for the purposes of the State equal protection provision.
Court’s Reasoning
The court held that jury service is both a privilege of citizenship secured by Article I, § 1 of the State Constitution and a civil right explicitly protected by Civil Rights Law § 13, which states that no citizen shall be disqualified from jury service based on race. The court reasoned that the Civil Rights Clause of Article I, § 11 prohibits private as well as state discrimination regarding civil rights. "[I]t is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government" (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130). The court found “State action” because the State is “inevitably and inextricably involved in the process of excluding jurors as a result of a defendant’s peremptory challenges.” The statute (CPL 270.25) confers the right, the jurors are summoned by the State, and the judge enforces the discriminatory decision. The court concluded that “judicial enforcement of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges exercised by defense counsel constitutes ‘State action’ for the purposes of our State equal protection provision.” The court affirmed the lower court’s order.