People v. Roselle, 74 N.Y.2d 838 (1989)
While the statutory requirement for written notice of a suppression motion exists to protect the People from unfair surprise, the People can waive this requirement, but such waiver must be clear and voluntary.
Summary
This case addresses whether the People can waive the statutory requirement (CPL 710.60(1)) that pretrial motions to suppress evidence must be in writing. The Court of Appeals held that while such a waiver is permissible, it did not occur in this case because the prosecutor initially requested a written motion, indicating no intent to waive the requirement. The court emphasized that the People’s participation in subsequent proceedings after the trial court allowed an oral motion did not constitute waiver, as further objection would have been futile. The Appellate Division erred in addressing the merits of the suppression motion after determining the oral motion was improperly considered.
Facts
Defendant was arraigned on burglary charges. Defense counsel made an oral application to suppress evidence seized during the arrest. The prosecutor initially requested a written motion to expedite the process. The County Court decided to entertain the oral application, stating the People wouldn’t be prejudiced. The prosecutor, unprepared due to the lack of written notice, primarily relied on the police report during the discussion. A suppression hearing was held, and the County Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress.
Procedural History
The County Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the oral application should not have been heard under CPL 710.60(1). However, the Appellate Division then addressed the merits of the suppression motion, denied it, and remitted the case for further proceedings. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether a trial court has the authority to dispense with the written notice requirement of CPL 710.60(1) in the exercise of its inherent authority to control its calendar?
2. Whether the People can waive the requirement of written notice for a suppression motion under CPL 710.60(1)?
3. Whether the People, by participating in the suppression hearing after initially requesting a written motion, effectively waived their right to written notice in this case?
Holding
1. No, because the courts cannot exercise their discretion in a manner that conflicts with existing legislative command.
2. Yes, because the written notice requirement primarily protects the People from unfair surprise, and they should be able to waive it if they deem the protection unnecessary.
3. No, because the prosecutor initially requested a written motion, and further objection after the court’s ruling would have been futile; participation in the hearing did not constitute a voluntary waiver.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that while trial courts have some inherent authority to control their calendars and regulate motion practice, this authority cannot override clear statutory mandates like CPL 710.60(1), which requires written notice for suppression motions. The Court distinguished this case from situations where the People’s failure to object constitutes a waiver, noting that the written notice requirement primarily serves to protect the People from unfair surprise. Citing People v. Jennings, the Court stated that such a rule is “designed primarily to protect the People from unfair surprise.”
The Court emphasized that the People’s request for a written motion indicated their desire to receive the protection afforded by the statute. Once the trial court overruled this request by stating it would permit an oral motion, any further objection would have been futile. The Court stated, “The law does not require litigants to make repeated pointless protests after the court has made its position clear.” Thus, the People’s subsequent participation in the proceedings did not constitute a waiver. Finally, the Court held that the Appellate Division, after determining the oral motion was improper, should have simply reversed the suppression order and remitted the case, rather than addressing the merits of the motion. The court emphasized that, because the motion was not properly made, “it was, in effect, a nullity.”