In re Aaron J., 80 N.Y.2d 402 (1992)
A judicial referral for adjustment services under Family Court Act § 320.6 tolls the time specified in Family Court Act § 340.1 for commencing the fact-finding hearing for a period of up to 120 days, provided that section 308.1(9)’s requirement for a judicially granted extension is observed.
Summary
This case addresses the interplay between the speedy trial requirements of Family Court Act § 340.1 and the provisions for adjustment services under § 320.6 and § 308.1. The Court of Appeals held that a judicial referral for adjustment services tolls the 60-day speedy trial clock for up to 120 days, aligning the timelines for pre-petition and post-petition adjustment services. This decision ensures that juveniles receive the full benefit of adjustment services without jeopardizing timely adjudication. The ruling harmonizes potentially conflicting statutory provisions and promotes the legislative intent of encouraging the adjustment of juvenile cases.
Facts
A juvenile delinquency petition was filed against Aaron J., charging him with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. At his initial appearance on September 24, 1990, the Family Court, over the presentment agency’s objection, referred Aaron J. to the Probation Department for adjustment services. The court adjourned the proceeding for three weeks. On October 16, 1990, the Probation Department reported that Aaron J. agreed to seek employment to pay $320 in restitution, but expressed doubt about his ability to do so within the required timeframe. At Aaron J.’s request, the proceeding was adjourned for another 30 days. On November 15, 1990, Aaron J. failed to appear, leading to another adjournment. When he appeared on November 20, 1990, the court learned he had not cooperated with the Probation Department, leading to the abandonment of adjustment efforts. The fact-finding hearing was scheduled for December 6, 1990.
Procedural History
At the fact-finding hearing on December 6, 1990, Aaron J.’s counsel moved to dismiss the petition, arguing a violation of the speedy trial requirements of Family Court Act § 340.1(2). The Family Court denied the motion, holding that the period of adjustment services should be excluded from the speedy trial calculation. Aaron J. was found guilty, adjudged a juvenile delinquent, and placed on probation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether a judicial referral for adjustment services under Family Court Act § 320.6 tolls the 60-day period specified in Family Court Act § 340.1 for commencing a fact-finding hearing in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.
Holding
Yes, because a referral for adjustment services tolls the time for commencing the fact-finding hearing for up to 120 days, provided the requirements of Family Court Act § 308.1(9) for judicial extensions are met. This construction harmonizes the statutes and furthers the legislative intent of encouraging adjustment.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that while Family Court Act § 340.1(2) requires a fact-finding hearing to commence within 60 days of the initial appearance, Family Court Act § 308.1(9) allows adjustment services to extend up to 120 days with judicial approval. The Court emphasized that § 320.6(4) directs that the procedures of § 308.1 are to be applied when a case has been judicially referred for adjustment. To not toll the speedy trial clock would discourage the use of adjustment services after a petition has been filed. The Court stated that Family Court Act § 320.6 was enacted “to encourage the adjustment of appropriate cases even after a petition is filed.” Denying a toll would frustrate this goal because “adjustments often entail such time-consuming ameliorative measures as multiple counselling sessions, psychological evaluations and referrals to community service agencies.” The Court harmonized the statutes, stating that a referral for adjustment services tolls the time specified in Family Court Act § 340.1 for commencing the fact-finding hearing for a period of up to 120 days, provided that § 308.1(9)’s requirement for a judicially granted extension is observed. Because this condition was met in Aaron J.’s case, his motion to dismiss was properly denied.