People v. Smith, 82 N.Y.2d 676 (1993)

Under New York’s speedy trial statute, the prosecution must affirmatively communicate readiness for trial on the record, and any delays caused by the court or the prosecution’s inability to proceed are chargeable to the prosecution unless a valid certificate of readiness has been filed.

Summary

The case clarifies the prosecution’s obligation to demonstrate readiness for trial under CPL 30.30, New York’s speedy trial statute. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution is charged with any delay beyond the adjournment date they requested unless they affirmatively state their readiness for trial on the record or file a certificate of readiness. The defense’s rejection of the original date or the defense counsel’s unavailability does not automatically exclude that time from being charged to the prosecution. The case emphasizes the need for a clear, objective record of prosecutorial readiness to avoid ambiguity and ensure defendants’ speedy trial rights.

Facts

The specific facts of the underlying criminal case are not detailed in this decision. The appeal concerns only the issue of whether the prosecution met its obligation to be ready for trial within the statutory timeframe stipulated by CPL 30.30. The prosecution requested adjournments, but the defense either rejected the proposed dates or defense counsel was unavailable on those dates.

Procedural History

The lower court dismissed the charges against the defendant, finding that the prosecution had exceeded the allowable time under CPL 30.30 to be ready for trial. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the time between the prosecution’s requested adjournment date and the date the case was actually adjourned to, due to defense counsel’s unavailability, should be charged to the prosecution under CPL 30.30.
2. Whether defense counsel’s unavailability or rejection of the prosecution’s initial adjournment date constitutes consent to the delay, thereby relieving the prosecution of responsibility for that portion of the delay.

Holding

1. No, because the prosecution never stated their readiness for trial on the record or filed a certificate of readiness; therefore, the entirety of the adjournment periods are chargeable to the prosecution.
2. No, because adjournments consented to by the defense must be clearly expressed to relieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay, and defense counsel’s failure to object or appear does not constitute consent.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized the two-pronged test for determining prosecutorial readiness established in People v. Kendzia, requiring both a communication of readiness on the trial court’s record and actual readiness to proceed at that time. The Court stated, “‘ready for trial’ [pursuant to] CPL 30.30 (1) encompasses two necessary elements”. The Court noted that delays caused by the court do not excuse the People from timely declaring their readiness. To avoid being charged with delays, the prosecution can file a certificate of readiness. The Court reasoned that a clear statement or filing objectively establishes the date on which the prosecution can proceed and avoids the need for courts to determine to whom adjournment delays should be charged. Regarding defense counsel’s unavailability, the Court held that consent to adjournments must be “clearly expressed” and that mere failure to object does not constitute consent. The Court highlighted that the adjournments were initially caused by the People’s failure to be ready for trial, and the defense never formally consented to the specific adjournment dates. The court reiterated, “Adjournments consented to by the defense must be clearly expressed to relieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay. Defense counsel’s failure to object to the adjournment or failure to appear does not constitute consent”.