People v. Blair, 73 N.Y.2d 779 (1988)
A prosecutor has a duty to disclose any promises of leniency made to a witness in exchange for their testimony, and this duty extends to correcting false testimony by a witness on the subject, even if the trial assistants were unaware of the specific promises made by a superior within the same office.
Summary
Defendants were convicted of manslaughter and criminal possession of a weapon based largely on the testimony of Tony Malloy, a witness with a criminal history and pending charges. Prior to trial, the defense requested disclosure of any promises made to Malloy in exchange for his testimony. While the prosecution revealed some arrangements, it failed to disclose an agreement between an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) and Malloy’s attorney that Malloy would avoid prison on his pending charges if he testified against the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals held that this nondisclosure was a Brady violation requiring a new trial, emphasizing the prosecutor’s duty to disclose promises of leniency and correct false testimony, regardless of internal knowledge within the prosecutor’s office.
Facts
Tony Malloy was the prosecution’s primary witness against the defendants, identifying them in connection with the death of Maxine Peterson.
Malloy had a history of drug use and prior felony convictions, and at the time of the trial, he had three open felony charges pending against him.
Before trial, the defense requested any promises of leniency made to Malloy in exchange for his testimony.
The prosecution disclosed that it had purchased airplane tickets to Virginia for Malloy and his girlfriend, paid their first month’s rent, and gave Malloy $1,500 in cash.
The pending charges against Malloy were adjourned until after the defendants’ trial.
At trial, Malloy testified that no promises of leniency had been made regarding his pending charges, despite admitting that he had spoken with ADA McCarthy multiple times.
Procedural History
The defendants were convicted of manslaughter, second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon, second degree in the trial court.
During trial, the defense learned of an agreement between ADA McCarthy and Malloy’s attorney, Jonathan Latimer, that Malloy would avoid incarceration if he testified truthfully.
The defendants moved for dismissal or a new trial based on the Brady violation (failure to disclose exculpatory evidence).
The trial court ruled that a Brady violation occurred but determined it did not deprive the defendants of a fair trial.
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the prosecution’s failure to disclose the agreement required a new trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose the agreement between ADA McCarthy and Malloy’s attorney, promising leniency to Malloy in exchange for his testimony, constituted a Brady violation requiring a new trial.
Whether the Brady violation was excused because the defense learned of the agreement during trial.
Holding
Yes, because the prosecution has a duty to disclose any promises of leniency made to a witness in exchange for their testimony, and this duty extends to correcting false testimony by a witness on the subject. The studied effort by the prosecution to avoid these accepted standards of conduct and to undermine the rule of Savvides cannot be condoned.
No, because there was no full disclosure by an informed prosecutor here. The court and defense counsel were kept in ignorance of what the material is.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court emphasized the prosecutor’s dual role as an advocate and a public officer, requiring fairness to the accused and candor with the courts.
The Court cited Brady v. Maryland, highlighting the prosecution’s duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, including promises of leniency to witnesses.
ADA McCarthy’s deliberate attempt to shield the trial assistants and Malloy from knowledge of the agreement undermined the purposes of the Brady and Savvides rules.
“In the final analysis, however, it does not matter whether the trial assistants were genuinely unaware of the arrangement or not. A prosecutor’s obligations to correct false testimony given by prosecution witnesses and to disclose Brady material are duties exercised by individual prosecutors and shared by the prosecutor’s office as a whole.”
The trial assistants were chargeable with knowledge of McCarthy’s promises to Malloy’s attorney, and they had a responsibility to clarify the record after Malloy testified that no deal for leniency had been struck.
“After Malloy had testified that no deal for leniency had been struck, the trial assistants, as representatives of their office, had the responsibility of clarifying the record by disclosing all the details of what had actually transpired between their office and Malloy and his attorney.”
The Court rejected the argument that disclosure during trial obviated the Brady violation because there was no full disclosure by an informed prosecutor. The harm was not harmless, as Malloy was the sole identification witness, and his credibility was pivotal. “The error cannot be said to be harmless (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237). Malloy was the sole identification witness, and his credibility was a pivotal consideration.”