Corning Glass Works v. Ovsanik, 84 N.Y.2d 619 (1994)
Inordinate delay by the State Division of Human Rights (DHR) in processing a discrimination complaint does not warrant dismissal unless the charged party demonstrates substantial actual prejudice attributable to the delay that impairs their ability to mount a defense.
Summary
Corning Glass Works appealed a DHR determination finding handicap discrimination against an employee with a neurological condition. The Appellate Division reversed, citing an 8-year delay between the complaint and the final determination as substantially prejudicial. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal. While acknowledging the excessive delay, the Court held that Corning Glass Works failed to demonstrate actual prejudice to its ability to defend itself. Increased back-pay liability alone is not sufficient prejudice to warrant dismissal. The case was remitted for a new review due to the Commissioner’s prior involvement as DHR’s general counsel.
Facts
An employee with a hereditary neurological condition causing tremors was hired by Corning Glass Works on January 9, 1984, and terminated on February 27, 1984, during his probationary period. On March 6, 1984, the employee filed a handicap discrimination complaint with the DHR. Hearings took place intermittently from March 1987 to September 1988. An ALJ issued a decision in August 1991, recommending reinstatement, back pay, and damages. This was followed by an administrative appeal and further recommendations, culminating in the DHR Commissioner’s final determination in October 1992.
Procedural History
The DHR Commissioner issued a final determination finding discrimination. Corning Glass Works commenced a proceeding challenging the DHR’s determination. The Appellate Division granted the petition and annulled the DHR determination, finding a due process violation and substantial prejudice due to the delay. The complainant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the 8-year delay by the DHR in processing the discrimination complaint caused Corning Glass Works substantial prejudice warranting dismissal of the complaint.
Holding
No, because Corning Glass Works failed to demonstrate that the delay actually prejudiced its ability to defend itself. Increased back-pay liability, without more, is insufficient to warrant dismissal.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals held that the time limits in Executive Law § 297 are directory, not mandatory, designed to benefit complainants. Dismissal is only appropriate when the delay causes substantial actual prejudice to the charged party’s ability to mount a defense. The court distinguished between financial impact (increased back pay) and impairment of defensive capabilities. Increased back-pay liability can be addressed by adjusting the award or remitting to the agency for recalculation, as stated in the case, “[a]n administrative agency awarding back pay, at an appropriate hearing or otherwise, can assess the nature and length of the delay, determine whether it is unreasonable, and adjust back pay accordingly.” The court referenced factors from Cortlandt Nursing Home v. Axelrod for evaluating the reasonableness of administrative delays: (1) the nature of the private interest allegedly compromised; (2) the actual prejudice; (3) the causal connection between the parties’ conduct and the delay; and (4) the underlying public policy. While the delay was not attributable to Corning Glass Works, there was no evidence of “repetitive, purposeless and oppressive” conduct by the DHR. The court balanced the delay against the public policy of addressing discrimination. The case was remitted for a new review because the DHR Commissioner had previously served as the DHR’s general counsel, creating a conflict of interest as described in Matter of General Motors Corp. v Rosa. The Court reiterated that courts should closely scrutinize the record for substantial prejudice due to delay.