People v. Vargas, 86 N.Y.2d 215 (1995)
It is reversible error for a prosecutor to call a witness knowing they will invoke the Fifth Amendment and then argue that the witness’s silence implies the defendant’s guilt.
Summary
Vargas was convicted of murder based on circumstantial evidence. A key witness, Arlequín, invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when questioned about his involvement and knowledge of the crime. The prosecutor, despite knowing Arlequín would plead the Fifth, repeatedly questioned him on matters he refused to answer and then argued in summation that Arlequín’s silence implied Vargas’s guilt. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Vargas’s conviction, holding that the prosecutor’s actions prejudiced Vargas’s right to a fair trial and that a curative instruction was insufficient to mitigate the damage.
Facts
Lourdes Caban was murdered in her car. Police investigation led to Anthony Arlequín, Vargas’s cousin, who initially implicated Vargas in a statement to the police. At trial, Arlequín, after initially stating his prior statement was a lie, was called as a witness by the prosecution. He invoked his Fifth Amendment right in response to most questions about his involvement and Vargas’s role in the murder. The prosecutor continued to question him on these matters in front of the jury, despite knowing he would assert his Fifth Amendment privilege.
Procedural History
Vargas was convicted of second-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon. He appealed, arguing the prosecutor improperly used Arlequín’s Fifth Amendment invocation to prejudice the jury against him. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the error harmless due to the trial court’s limiting instruction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
- Whether the prosecutor committed reversible error by calling a witness who she knew would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege and then using that invocation to argue the defendant’s guilt.
Holding
- Yes, because the prosecutor deliberately elicited the witness’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment and then used it to build an impermissible inference of the defendant’s guilt, thereby denying the defendant a fair trial.
Court’s Reasoning
The court relied on the principle that the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from being compelled to testify against themselves. The court stated, “When the People question a witness knowing the witness will respond by invoking the Fifth Amendment, and then compound the prejudice to defendant by expressing in closing argument that the witness’s claim of the testimonial privilege was evidence of defendant’s guilt, defendant is deprived of a fair trial.” It also cited Namet v. United States, establishing the framework for evaluating challenges related to a witness pleading the Fifth Amendment at trial. Key factors include the prosecutor’s conduct, the significance of the questions, whether inferences were drawn in closing arguments, the witness’s relationship to the defendant, and jury instructions.
The court found that the prosecutor received clear indication of what the witness would not discuss and the court directed the prosecutor not to question him on those matters. The court found that the prosecutor’s repeated questioning and summation arguments were designed to create the inference that Arlequín was protecting Vargas. The court noted the absence of direct evidence linking Vargas to the murder, making the unfavorable inference irresistible. The limiting instruction was insufficient to mitigate the prejudice. The court concluded, “Defendant was irreparably prejudiced when the prosecutor purposely called a witness knowing full well that the witness would invoke the Fifth Amendment and then seized on the witness’s silence in summation to bolster the People’s case against defendant.” The People cannot justify the approach employed in this case on the ground that defendant might have been entitled to a missing witness charge if Arlequín did not testify.