People v. Torres, 88 N.Y.2d 928 (1996)
The prosecution is not required to demonstrate due diligence in locating a defendant to exclude periods of delay from speedy trial calculations when the defendant is actively attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution.
Summary
Defendant was arrested for drug possession, failed to appear for arraignment, and a bench warrant was issued. After his re-arrest, he moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in requiring the People to demonstrate due diligence in locating the defendant during the period he was a fugitive because the trial court had found he was actively avoiding apprehension. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to review that finding and other relevant factual issues.
Facts
Defendant was arrested on March 27, 1989, and indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. He was released on his own recognizance but failed to appear for arraignment on the indictment on June 13, 1989, resulting in a bench warrant for his arrest. A detective was assigned to the warrant on July 5, 1989. The detective periodically checked the computer for information and received a photograph of the defendant on July 24, 1989. The detective investigated two addresses provided by the defendant and discovered that neither was valid. On June 27, 1990, defendant was arrested while assisting a co-conspirator attempting to smuggle cocaine. He later pleaded guilty to a federal indictment.
Procedural History
While incarcerated on federal charges, defendant moved to dismiss the state charges on speedy trial grounds; the Supreme Court denied the motion. A jury convicted defendant of criminal possession. The Appellate Division held the appeal in abeyance and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for a de nova hearing on the speedy trial motion. On remand, the Supreme Court determined defendant’s speedy trial rights had not been violated, because he had been avoiding apprehension and the People had exercised due diligence in attempting to locate him. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the People had failed to exercise due diligence, and granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether the 73-day period from July 24, 1989, to October 6, 1989, should be charged to the People in calculating the speedy trial period, given that the People allegedly failed to exercise due diligence in locating the defendant.
Holding
No, because pursuant to CPL 30.30(4)(c), the People need not exercise due diligence in attempting to locate a defendant who is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals focused on CPL 30.30 (4)(c), which addresses excluding periods of delay from the time chargeable to the People when a defendant’s location is unknown and the defendant is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution. The Court stated, “The People need not exercise due diligence in attempting to locate a defendant who is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution” (People v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71, 80, n. 3). The Court found that the Appellate Division erred in imposing a due diligence requirement on the prosecution. The Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division, instructing it to review the Supreme Court’s finding that the defendant had attempted to avoid apprehension or prosecution, along with any other relevant factual issues.