89 N.Y.2d 506 (1997)
Under CPLR 214-c (2), the statute of limitations in a toxic tort case begins to run when the plaintiff discovers the primary condition on which the claim is based, not when the plaintiff connects the condition to a specific cause.
Summary
Susan Wetherill sued DES manufacturers, claiming injuries from her mother’s DES use during pregnancy. Her action, filed in 1992, followed years of reproductive issues, including miscarriages and a diagnosis of a T-shaped uterus. The key issue was whether the statute of limitations began when she knew of her conditions or later, when she suspected a DES link. The Court of Appeals held that the statute began when Wetherill knew of her injuries, regardless of when she linked them to DES. The court reasoned that CPLR 214-c(4) specifically addresses delays in discovering the cause, and the legislative intent was to address the discovery of the injury itself, not its cause. Thus, the action was time-barred.
Facts
Susan Wetherill experienced several reproductive health issues, including dysplasia (diagnosed in 1978/1979), multiple miscarriages (1980/1981, 1984, 1986), a T-shaped uterus (diagnosed in 1987), and an incompetent cervix (diagnosed after a preterm delivery in 1988). She first learned of DES and its potential impact on daughters of users around March 1988 through a conversation with her sister. She overheard a physician mention that her medical history revealed “classic symptoms of DES” in late 1989.
Procedural History
Wetherill commenced action in August 1992. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, finding it time-barred. The Appellate Division reversed, stating the statute of limitations began when the plaintiff discovered her symptoms were attributable to a third party. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, dismissing the complaint.
Issue(s)
Whether the “discovery of the injury” under CPLR 214-c (2) occurs when the plaintiff discovers the symptoms or when the plaintiff connects those symptoms to a non-biological cause (i.e., exposure to a harmful substance)?
Holding
No, the “discovery of the injury” under CPLR 214-c(2) occurs when the plaintiff discovers the symptoms or manifestations of the injury itself, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the cause of the injury because CPLR 214-c(4) provides a specific mechanism for extending the statute of limitations when the cause of the injury is discovered later.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that CPLR 214-c(4) anticipates situations where a plaintiff is aware of the injury but not its cause, providing an extension under certain conditions. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that CPLR 214-c(4) only applies when the precise toxic substance is unknown, but not when the very fact of a non-natural cause is unknown, stating, “discovery that a plaintiff’s symptoms were attributable to an injury inflicted by an outside force is the same as ‘discovery of the cause of the injury’ within the meaning of CPLR 214-c (4), and the plaintiff’s proposed distinction is illusory.” The court emphasized that CPLR 214-c was enacted to address the harshness of prior case law where claims were barred before the harm was even discovered. The legislature intended to focus on the discovery of the physical condition, not its non-organic etiology. The Court stated, “The goal of the Legislature in adopting CPLR 214-c was to ‘provide relief to injured New Yorkers whose claims would otherwise be dismissed for untimeliness simply because they were unaware of the latent injuries until after the limitations period had expired.’” The dissent argued the majority’s interpretation removed the factual inquiry into the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence, replacing it with an objective standard. The dissent also pointed out that the majority effectively required plaintiffs to sue before potential defendants were identified. The court countered that “if the interpretation and rationale advanced by the dissent were to prevail, the date for commencing an action under CPLR 214-c (2) would depend on such fortuitous circumstances as the medical sophistication of the individual plaintiff and the diagnostic acuity of his or her chosen physician.”