достаем v. Kutsher’s Country Club, 84 N.Y.2d 988 (1994)
A property owner can be held liable for negligence when they encourage another to use a dangerous instrumentality (here, a boat) without providing readily available safety equipment, even if statutory requirements for such equipment are not directly applicable.
Summary
This case addresses the duty of care owed by property owners who advise or encourage others to use potentially dangerous instrumentalities on their property. The plaintiff’s decedent was hired to paint the defendant’s lakefront house and was encouraged to use the defendant’s rowboat to assess the paint job from the lake. The decedent drowned, and the plaintiff alleged negligence for failure to provide readily accessible life preservers. The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants, holding that a jury could find the defendants negligent for encouraging the boat’s use without making safety equipment available, regardless of whether the boat was technically “in use” under Navigation Law § 40 (1) (a).
Facts
The decedent was hired by the defendants to paint their lakefront house.
The defendants “advised” the decedent to use their rowboat to view the paint job from the lake.
Life preservers were not readily accessible or visible on the defendants’ property.
The decedent drowned while using the boat.
Procedural History
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the complaint.
The Appellate Division affirmed.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remanding the case for trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the defendants had a duty to make flotation devices available to the decedent given their encouragement to use the boat.
Whether the decedent’s actions constituted unforeseeable or reckless conduct that would sever the causal connection between the defendants’ negligence and the decedent’s death.
Holding
Yes, because a rational trier of fact could conclude that the defendants’ instruction to use the boat made it foreseeable that the decedent would take the boat onto the lake, thus obligating them to make life preservers or similar safety equipment available.
No, because the decedent’s possible intoxication or poor swimming ability, even if true, are factors of comparative culpability, but do not automatically constitute unforeseeable or reckless conduct that breaks the causal chain.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that while Navigation Law § 40 (1) (a) might not have required the defendants to keep flotation devices on their boat when it was on land, common-law tort principles still apply. The court emphasized that encouraging the decedent to use the boat created a foreseeable risk that he would use it on the lake. This foreseeability triggered a duty to provide readily accessible safety equipment.
The Court distinguished this case from situations where the plaintiff’s actions are so reckless or unforeseeable that they sever the causal connection. The decedent’s possible negligence (poor swimming, possible alcohol consumption) is relevant to comparative negligence but does not automatically absolve the defendants of their duty of care. The court cited Olsen v. Town of Richfield, 81 NY2d 1024 and Boltax v. Joy Day Camp, 67 NY2d 617, as examples of cases where the plaintiff’s conduct was deemed sufficiently unforeseeable to break the causal chain.
Key quotes:
“These factual claims, if believed, would justify a fact finder in concluding that defendants had a duty to make flotation devices available to the decedent, that defendants breached that duty and, finally, that their breach was the proximate cause of the decedent’s drowning.”
“[A] rational trier of fact could conclude, under traditional common-law tort principles, that defendants’ alleged instruction to the decedent made it foreseeable that he would take the boat out into the lake and that, consequently, defendants had an obligation to make life preservers or other similar safety equipment available for the decedent’s use.”