Francois v. Dolan, 95 N.Y.2d 33 (2000)
A defendant in a capital murder case does not have an unqualified right to plead guilty to the entire indictment before the prosecution has completed its statutorily provided deliberative process regarding whether to seek the death penalty.
Summary
Kendall Francois was indicted on multiple counts of murder. Before the District Attorney decided whether to seek the death penalty, Francois attempted to plead guilty to all counts. The District Attorney opposed the plea, and the trial court refused to accept it. Francois sought a writ of mandamus to compel the court to accept his plea. The New York Court of Appeals held that mandamus did not lie because a capital defendant does not have an unqualified right to plead guilty before the prosecution has concluded its deliberation period on whether to seek the death penalty. This decision protects the District Attorney’s statutory authority to decide whether to seek the death penalty.
Facts
Kendall Francois was indicted on eight counts of first-degree murder, eight counts of second-degree murder, and one count of attempted second-degree assault. Francois was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Before the District Attorney filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, Francois attempted to plead guilty to the entire indictment. The District Attorney opposed the plea, and the trial court reserved decision. The District Attorney then filed a death penalty notice, and the trial court ultimately refused to accept Francois’s guilty plea.
Procedural History
Francois initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding at the Appellate Division, seeking mandamus to compel the County Court to “entertain” his guilty plea. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition. Francois appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether mandamus lies to compel a County Court to entertain a defendant’s offer to plead guilty to all counts of an indictment charging capital murder before the District Attorney files a notice of intent to seek the death penalty and before the expiration of the statutory period for filing such notice.
Holding
No, because the defendant does not have an unqualified statutory right to plead guilty under these circumstances, and thus, lacks the “clear legal right” necessary for mandamus.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that allowing a defendant to plead guilty before the District Attorney’s decision would preempt two critical powers conferred on the District Attorney by the death penalty legislation. First, the defendant could prevent the prosecution from seeking the death penalty even after a notice of intent had been filed, because there is no provision for a jury sentencing stage after a guilty plea to capital murder. Second, the defendant could preclude the District Attorney from even considering whether to seek the death penalty. The court emphasized that the District Attorney’s role and statutory rights were central to the death penalty statute. The court also applied the canon of statutory interpretation that “what is special or particular in the later of two statutes supersedes as an exception whatever in the earlier statute is unlimited or general” (East End Trust Co. v. Otten, 255 N.Y. 283, 286). The specific death penalty provisions prevailed over the general plea provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law. The court further noted the potential for an “unseemly race to the courthouse” if defendants could preempt the District Attorney’s deliberative process. The court quoted CPL 250.40 (1) stating “A sentence of death may not be imposed * * * unless * * * the people file * * * and serve * * * a notice of intent to seek the death penalty”.