People v. Wood, 95 N.Y.2d 509 (2000)

A criminal prosecution for first-degree criminal contempt is barred by double jeopardy when the defendant was previously prosecuted for contempt in Family Court based on the same underlying conduct of violating an order of protection.

Summary

Timothy Wood’s ex-wife obtained two orders of protection: one from City Court and another from Family Court, both ordering him to have no contact with her. Wood made a series of prank phone calls to his ex-wife, which were traced to his residence. He was then held in contempt in Family Court for violating the Family Court order and sentenced to incarceration. Subsequently, he was indicted on criminal contempt charges for violating the City Court order based on the same phone calls. The New York Court of Appeals held that the subsequent criminal prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the Family Court contempt proceeding and the criminal contempt charges were based on the same conduct.

Facts

Timothy Wood’s ex-wife obtained two “no contact” orders of protection against him. One was issued by Rochester City Court, and the other was issued by Monroe County Family Court. On December 25, 1996, Wood’s ex-wife received eleven prank phone calls, which were traced to Wood’s residence. The ex-wife then initiated a contempt proceeding in Family Court. The criminal charges stemmed from the same phone calls that formed the basis of the Family Court action.

Procedural History

The Family Court found Wood guilty of willfully violating the Family Court order of protection and sentenced him to six months incarceration. Subsequently, Wood was indicted on multiple counts of criminal contempt and aggravated harassment based on the same phone calls that led to the Family Court contempt finding. The Supreme Court denied Wood’s motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Wood was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division reversed the criminal contempt convictions, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the criminal prosecution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether a criminal prosecution for first-degree criminal contempt is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause when the defendant has already been prosecuted for contempt in Family Court based on the same conduct of violating an order of protection.

Holding

Yes, because the contempt provision of the Family Court Act is a lesser included offense of criminal contempt in the first degree, and the Double Jeopardy Clause bars successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater offense after conviction for a lesser included offense.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals applied the Blockburger test, which asks whether each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not. If each offense contains an element the other does not, they are not the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes. The court found that the Family Court contempt provision did not contain an element different from Penal Law § 215.51(c) and that the statutory elements of the Family Court provision were subsumed by those of Penal Law § 215.51(c). Because the same acts violated both orders, Wood could not be guilty of first-degree criminal contempt for violating the City Court order without also being guilty of contempt for violating the Family Court order. The court emphasized that the Family Court contempt provision is a lesser included offense of criminal contempt in the first degree. The court stated, “Comparing the elements, we conclude that the contempt provision of the Family Court Act article 8 is clearly a lesser included offense of criminal contempt in the first degree. That the People sought to prove a violation of a City Court order and not a Family Court order does not, under these circumstances, alter the double jeopardy analysis under Blockburger.” The court further reasoned that allowing the People to circumvent the double jeopardy bar by prosecuting a criminal action for violation of another court order based on the same conduct would eviscerate the constitutional prohibition. The court recognized that although the Legislature allows parallel court proceedings in different venues in domestic violence cases, the orders of protection in this case had the same purpose.