96 N.Y.2d 378 (2001)
For voting purposes, an individual can have multiple residences, but must have legitimate, significant, and continuing attachments to the residence they choose for voting; the chosen residence must not be a sham.
Summary
John O’Hara, an attorney, was convicted of crimes related to filing a false voter registration and voting in an election district where he didn’t reside. The central issue was whether O’Hara’s 47th Street address constituted a valid “residence” under Election Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while an individual can have multiple residences, the chosen residence must be genuine and not merely for circumventing residency requirements. The court found the jury instructions adequate in guiding the determination of whether the 47th Street address was O’Hara’s bona fide residence, and the evidence supported the jury’s verdict.
Facts
O’Hara lived in a Brooklyn apartment on 61st Street since the 1980s. After redistricting, his 61st Street address was no longer within the relevant election districts. He then filed a new voter registration listing 47th Street as his residence and voted in five elections using that address. The prosecution argued O’Hara did not genuinely reside at the 47th Street address. Evidence showed O’Hara maintained phone service at the 61st Street address, and the owner confirmed his tenancy there. Witnesses testified that when they moved into the 47th Street address, it was uninhabitable, and O’Hara later asked them to hold his mail. O’Hara claimed he lived there with his ex-girlfriend, but other evidence suggested otherwise.
Procedural History
O’Hara was convicted on all counts in 1997. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction due to an improper missing witness charge, ordering a new trial. The second trial resulted in a hung jury. The third trial also resulted in a conviction, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division. O’Hara appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the Election Law definition of “residence” can be applied in a case of dual residency, and whether the jury instructions regarding the definition of “residence” were proper.
Holding
No, the jury instruction was proper because it sufficiently guided the jury in determining whether the defendant had a bona fide residence at the 47th Street address for voting purposes. The court held that the charge, when read as a whole, was not confusing, and the jury applied that instruction to the facts it found.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals stated that while an individual can have more than one residence, for Election Law purposes, the chosen residence must be a genuine one with “legitimate, significant and continuing attachments” and not a sham created to circumvent residency requirements. Citing Election Law § 1-104 (22), the court defines residence as “that place where a person maintains a fixed, permanent and principal home and to which he, wherever temporarily located, always intends to return.” The Court reasoned that the jury was properly instructed on how to determine whether the 47th Street address could be considered O’Hara’s residence for voting purposes. The court emphasized that “the sole issue here was whether defendant genuinely took up residence at 553 47th Street for voting purposes.” The jury was not asked to decide which of two residences was more appropriate, but whether the 47th street address was in fact a residence that he genuinely maintained and intended to return. The court dismissed the dissenting opinion’s claim that the Election Law definition and case law definitions of residence cannot stand side-by-side, noting that the defendant’s own testimony, even if credited, was contradicted by other evidence presented, which the jury was entitled to believe.