Chapman v. Silber, 97 N.Y.2d 9 (2001)

A landlord may be held liable for lead paint poisoning if they had constructive notice of the hazardous condition, based on factors such as the building’s age, visible peeling paint, awareness of the dangers of lead paint to children, and knowledge that a young child resided in the apartment.

Summary

This case addresses the level of notice required to hold a landlord liable for lead paint poisoning in New York. The Court of Appeals held that, absent specific legislation, a landlord can be liable if they retained a right of entry and duty to repair, knew the building predated the lead paint ban, observed peeling paint, understood the dangers of lead paint to children, and knew a young child lived in the apartment. The Court reversed the Appellate Division in Chapman, finding sufficient evidence of constructive notice, but affirmed in Stover, where such evidence was lacking. This decision clarifies the standard for establishing landlord liability in lead paint cases based on common-law negligence principles.

Facts

In Chapman, the Chapmans rented an apartment from the Silbers. The lease required the tenant to maintain the apartment but allowed the landlord entry for repairs. Mrs. Chapman complained to Jay Silber about peeling paint on the porch, which he addressed by paying Mr. Chapman to repaint it. The Chapmans’ child, Jaquan, developed elevated lead levels, and lead paint was detected in the apartment. In Stover, Carlisa Stover rented an apartment from James O’Connor. She complained about a door and toilet, which were repaired, but not about the paint. Stover’s younger son, Everton, ingested material from holes in the wall and developed high lead levels. O’Connor knew lead paint was dangerous but claimed ignorance of Stover’s pregnancy or young child.

Procedural History

In Chapman, the Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the denial of summary judgment. In Stover, the Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a landlord can be held liable for lead paint poisoning absent actual knowledge of lead in the paint.
2. What constitutes sufficient notice of a hazardous lead paint condition to impose a duty on a landlord to remediate it.

Holding

1. In Chapman, yes, because the landlord had constructive notice of the hazardous condition based on multiple factors. In Stover, no, because there was insufficient evidence that the landlord was on actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition.
2. In Chapman, a triable issue of fact is raised when the landlord retained a right of entry and a duty to make repairs, knew the apartment was constructed before lead-based paint was banned, was aware that paint was peeling, knew of the hazards of lead-based paint to young children, and knew that a young child lived in the apartment.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that while landlords generally aren’t liable for injuries after transferring possession, an exception exists when the landlord assumes a duty to repair and reserves the right to enter the premises. The Court distinguished Juarez v. Wavecrest Mgt. Team, which involved a New York City ordinance creating a presumption of notice for lead paint hazards. Absent such a statute, common-law negligence principles apply. The Court rejected the Appellate Division’s rule requiring actual knowledge of lead in the paint, deeming it impractical. In Chapman, the landlord’s awareness of the building’s age, peeling paint, lead paint dangers, and the presence of a young child created constructive notice. Quoting Queeney v Willi, the Court stated, “[t]he landlord may not sit helplessly by and say that he cannot see what produces such conditions.” In Stover, the evidence was insufficient to establish constructive notice. The Court emphasized it was not creating a new duty to test for lead paint based solely on general knowledge of risks. Instead, it applied existing notice principles. The Court explicitly stated, “We hold only that a landlord who actually knows of the existence of many conditions indicating a lead paint hazard to young children may, in the minds of the jury, also be charged constructively with notice of the hazard.”