In re Estates of Covert, 97 N.Y.2d 68 (2001)
The doctrine preventing a wrongdoer from profiting from their crime (Riggs v. Palmer) does not automatically disinherit the wrongdoer’s innocent heirs from receiving testamentary bequests from the victim’s will.
Summary
This case addresses whether the principle preventing a wrongdoer from profiting from their crime requires disinheritance of the wrongdoer’s heirs, negating their bequests in the victim’s will. Edward killed his wife Kathleen, then himself. Kathleen’s will bequeathed property to Edward, and a share of the residuary estate to Edward’s parents and siblings (the Coverts). Kathleen’s parents (the Millards) argued that Edward’s actions should prevent the Coverts from inheriting. The court held that because the Coverts were innocent distributees, they were entitled to their share of Kathleen’s estate, as the Riggs v. Palmer doctrine should not be extended to cause proprietary forfeiture for innocent parties.
Facts
On April 3, 1998, Edward shot and killed Kathleen, and then committed suicide.
Edward and Kathleen had executed a joint will in 1995. The will left all property to the surviving spouse.
Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the residuary estate was to be divided equally among Edward’s parents, Kathleen’s parents, and the couple’s siblings.
Kathleen’s probate and non-probate assets were valued at $225,000. Edward’s assets were worth approximately $71,000. The couple also held $121,000 in joint tenancy.
Procedural History
The will was admitted to probate, and the executrix petitioned the Surrogate’s Court for direction on how to distribute the estates.
The Coverts demanded strict compliance with the will.
The Millards argued that Edward’s crime should prevent the Coverts from inheriting.
The Surrogate’s Court granted summary judgment to the Millards, precluding the Coverts from taking any of Kathleen’s property. The Appellate Division modified the order, treating Edward as having predeceased Kathleen and directing all property to pass through Kathleen’s estate to be distributed in equal thirds. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the doctrine of Riggs v. Palmer, which prevents a wrongdoer from profiting from their crime, mandates the disinheritance of the wrongdoer’s heirs, thereby negating their entitlement to an express testamentary bequest made in the victim’s will.
Holding
No, because where a victim’s will makes bequests to the wrongdoer’s family—innocent distributees—their status as legatees under the victim’s will is not vitiated, and they are not disinherited by virtue of their familial relationship to the wrongdoer.
Court’s Reasoning
The court restated principles regarding will construction and testamentary distribution, noting that a validly executed joint will is a proper means of disposing of property. Testamentary instruments are strictly construed to give effect to the testator’s intent.
However, the court also acknowledged the equitable principle from Riggs v. Palmer that no one should profit from their own wrongdoing. In Riggs, the court prevented a grandson who murdered his grandfather from inheriting under the will.
The court clarified that the Riggs rule prevents wrongdoers from acquiring property or profiting from their wrongdoing, but it has never been applied to cause forfeiture of a vested property interest. Public policy, as reflected in Civil Rights Law § 79-b, militates against applying Riggs to cause proprietary forfeiture: “a conviction of a person for any crime, does not work a forfeiture of any property, real or personal, or any right or interest therein”.
Because Edward killed Kathleen, Riggs nullifies any bequests from Kathleen to him. However, the Millards’ argument to extend Riggs to void the gifts to the Coverts was rejected. Absent evidence that the Coverts were anything other than innocent distributees, Riggs is inapplicable.
The court noted that the insurance and pension funds were Edward’s property and the alternative beneficiaries were innocent distributees of his property and are entitled to take under the policies.
The court held that individual assets owned outright by Edward and Kathleen pass through their respective wills. Jointly held property should be divided in half, with half passing through Edward’s estate and half through Kathleen’s. Assets with named beneficiaries (insurance policies, pension plans) should pass to the alternative beneficiaries. The court distinguished Petrie v. Chase Manhattan Bank, noting that Petrie concerned the disposition of the victim’s property, and the murderer was first in line to benefit from his wrongful act.