New York Law Review

Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of New York, 97 N.Y.2d 378 (2001): Constitutionality of Special Laws Under Home Rule Doctrine

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Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of New York, 97 N.Y.2d 378 (2001)

A special law that relates to the property, affairs, or government of a locality is constitutional if enacted upon a home rule message or if the provision bears a direct and reasonable relationship to a substantial state concern.

Summary

This case concerns a dispute between the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) and the City of New York regarding collective bargaining. The central issue is the constitutionality of Chapter 641 of the Laws of 1998, which amended the Taylor Law, giving the State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) jurisdiction over impasse resolution for police and fire unions. The Court of Appeals held that Chapter 641 is a constitutional special law because it serves a substantial state concern related to public safety. Furthermore, PERB has jurisdiction over scope of bargaining issues when resolving impasses, but the City Board of Collective Bargaining (BCB) retains jurisdiction in other contexts.

Facts

The PBA and the City were in a collective bargaining dispute after their most recent agreement expired. The City filed a scope of bargaining petition with the BCB, arguing some of the PBA’s demands were not mandatory subjects of bargaining. The PBA argued the BCB lacked jurisdiction, asserting that PERB had final say. The PBA filed a declaration of impasse and a declaratory ruling petition with PERB. The City then filed an improper practice charge with BCB, alleging the PBA had not engaged in good faith bargaining. Both parties then filed declaratory judgment actions.

Procedural History

The actions were consolidated in Albany County Supreme Court, which granted the PBA’s motion, upholding the constitutionality of the statute. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding Chapter 641 a general law of statewide application. The City appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right on constitutional grounds, and the BCB appealed by leave granted.

Issue(s)

1. Is Chapter 641 a special law that violates the home rule provisions of the New York State Constitution?

2. Which agency, PERB or BCB, has jurisdiction to determine the scope of mandatory collective bargaining in negotiations between the City and the PBA?

Holding

1. No, because Chapter 641, although a special law, serves a substantial state concern, and thus the home rule requirements were not implicated.

2. PERB has jurisdiction over scope of bargaining issues between the PBA and the City only to the extent necessary for PERB to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction to resolve impasses. Until such time, BCB retains jurisdiction to determine scope of bargaining outside of the impasse context.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that while Chapter 641 is a “special law” because it primarily affects New York City and a few surrounding counties, it addresses a substantial state concern: fostering orderly resolution of collective bargaining disputes involving police and fire units to enhance public safety. The Court relied on the stated purpose and legislative history of the act. “The substantial State concern supporting the enactment of chapter 641 is expressed in section 1 of the statute: it is to foster “orderly resolution of collective bargaining disputes involving police and fire bargaining units * * * to enhance public safety and prevent the loss or interruption of vital public services” (L 1998, ch 641, § 1).” Therefore, the home rule requirements were not triggered.

Regarding jurisdiction, the Court held that PERB’s jurisdiction is limited to resolving impasses. To do so, PERB must determine what qualifies as a proper condition of employment. While the BCB also has the power and duty to determine whether a matter is within the scope of collective bargaining under New York City Collective Bargaining Law § 12-309, Chapter 641 did not divest BCB of all authority to determine scope of bargaining issues arising from collective negotiations between the City and police and fire unions. The Court noted the legislature did not amend Civil Service Law § 205 (5) (d), which authorizes BCB to exercise jurisdiction over improper practice charges, including a charge that a party is refusing to negotiate in good faith concerning terms and conditions of employment. The Court found that the legislature intended to equip PERB with all the powers it needs to resolve impasses but not to otherwise disturb BCB’s improper practice jurisdiction.

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