97 N.Y.2d 239 (2002)

When the prosecution declines to seek the death penalty in a first-degree murder case, the sentencing authority rests with the trial court, which is authorized to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, even after a guilty plea.

Summary

Gordon Mower pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. He later argued that the sentence was illegal because provisions of New York’s death penalty statute had been invalidated in Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, arguing that this removed the statutory basis for his sentence. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that when the prosecution does not seek the death penalty, the sentencing authority remains with the trial court, which can impose life without parole. The Court also held that Mower’s challenge to his guilty plea was unpreserved.

Facts

Gordon Mower was charged with the first-degree murder of his parents. The prosecution never filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. On the last day such notice could have been filed, Mower pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree murder in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, resolving all outstanding charges. During the plea colloquy, Mower admitted to intentionally shooting and killing both of his parents. He also withdrew his omnibus motion, which included constitutional challenges to the first-degree murder statute.

Procedural History

Mower was indicted in Otsego County, New York for first-degree murder. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. After Matter of Hynes v. Tomei invalidated certain plea provisions of New York’s death penalty statute, Mower filed a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his conviction. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division consolidated Mower’s direct appeal and CPL 440.10 appeal, affirming the conviction and sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the invalidation of CPL 220.10 (5) (e) and 220.30 (3) (b) (vii) in Matter of Hynes v. Tomei eliminated the statutory authorization for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole upon a plea to murder in the first degree.
2. Whether Mower’s first-degree murder conviction was affected by a mistake of law because he pleaded guilty pursuant to the statutory provisions later invalidated by this Court in Matter of Hynes v. Tomei.

Holding

1. No, because the trial court’s sentencing authority is not derived from the plea provisions struck in Hynes.
2. No, because Mower did not raise the alleged constitutional infirmity before he pleaded guilty or was sentenced.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that Penal Law § 60.06 and § 70.00 authorize the imposition of life imprisonment without parole for first-degree murder. CPL 400.27(1) states that nothing precludes the People from determining “at any time” that the death penalty should not be sought, in which case “the court may sentence such defendant to life imprisonment without parole.” The Court interpreted the statutes to mean that if the prosecution does not pursue the death penalty, the sentencing authority remains with the trial court, which is authorized to impose life imprisonment without parole, regardless of whether the conviction is by guilty plea or jury verdict.

The Court found Mower’s argument that his guilty plea was invalid because it was based on statutes later invalidated in Hynes to be unpreserved. Mower did not raise this issue before pleading guilty or being sentenced, and it was not the proper subject of a CPL 440.10 motion. The Court also noted that Mower had abandoned or forfeited his remaining claims. He abandoned his challenges to the validity of the first-degree murder statute and the integrity of the Grand Jury proceeding when he withdrew all pending motions. He forfeited his right to appeal his request for “heightened due process” consideration by pleading guilty.