In re Mason, 100 N.Y.2d 58 (2003)

Judges must be held to a higher standard of conduct than the public at large, and misuse of an attorney escrow account, coupled with a lack of candor and failure to cooperate with investigations, warrants removal from judicial office.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals reviewed a determination by the Commission on Judicial Conduct to remove Justice Reynold N. Mason from the Supreme Court. The charges stemmed from Mason’s misuse of his attorney escrow account, both before and after assuming his judicial role, along with a lack of cooperation and inconsistent statements during the Commission’s investigation. The Court of Appeals independently reviewed the evidence and determined that Mason’s actions constituted serious misconduct justifying removal from office. The court emphasized the heightened standard of conduct expected of judges and the significance of maintaining the integrity of attorney escrow accounts.

Facts

Reynold N. Mason, while a practicing attorney, vacated a rent-stabilized apartment in 1992. He facilitated his brother-in-law’s occupancy despite the landlord’s objections. The brother-in-law made rental payments to Mason, designated “as attorney,” totaling over $15,000. Mason deposited at least $7,000 of these funds into his attorney escrow account. He then used these funds for personal expenses, including payments to himself, creditors, and in cash withdrawals. Even after being elected as a Civil Court Judge in 1995, Mason continued to use the account for personal matters.

Procedural History

The Commission on Judicial Conduct sustained five charges of misconduct against Mason and determined he should be removed from office. Mason challenged the determination, arguing that a federal court decision invalidated some of the rules he was found to have violated. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, noting it was not bound by the federal district court decision. The Court of Appeals then conducted its own review of the record and upheld the Commission’s determination, ordering Mason’s removal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Justice Mason’s misuse of his attorney escrow account, including commingling funds and using the account for personal expenses, constitutes judicial misconduct.
2. Whether Justice Mason’s lack of cooperation with the Commission’s investigation and his inconsistent statements warrant disciplinary action.
3. Whether the appropriate sanction for Justice Mason’s misconduct is removal from judicial office.

Holding

1. Yes, because an attorney may not commingle personal funds with funds held in trust for others, nor may an attorney use an escrow account to pay personal expenses.
2. Yes, because failure to cooperate with the Commission’s investigation and lack of candor compound the seriousness of the underlying misconduct.
3. Yes, because the misconduct, viewed in light of the higher standard of conduct expected of judges, warrants removal from office.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized the established principle that attorneys cannot commingle personal funds with client funds or use escrow accounts for personal expenses. The court noted the confusion that arises when attorneys fail to properly safeguard funds deposited in an escrow account. Whether Mason held the rent money in trust for the landlord or collected it under a sublease, his deposit of the funds into his attorney escrow account and subsequent use for personal expenses constituted a serious violation. The Court stated, “[C]onfusion regarding the legal interests of an attorney and third parties ensues when an attorney fails strictly to segregate personal or business funds from trust funds or to identify and properly safeguard funds deposited in an escrow account.”

The court further highlighted Mason’s lack of cooperation with the Commission’s investigation and his inconsistent explanations as aggravating factors. The court directly quoted, “[J]udges must be held to a higher standard of conduct than the public at large.” The Court of Appeals conducted its own plenary review of the facts and law, ultimately concluding that removal was the appropriate sanction. They distinguished this as more than simply echoing the Commission’s analysis.