Matter of Friedman, 100 N.Y.2d 306 (2003)
A judicial candidate’s campaign statements violate the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct if they explicitly and repeatedly indicate an intention to “work with” and “assist” police and other law enforcement personnel if elected, as such statements compromise the faithful and impartial performance of judicial duties.
Summary
This case concerns a City Court Judge, Friedman, who made campaign statements indicating he would “work with” police if elected. The Commission on Judicial Conduct determined this violated rules against making pledges of conduct in office other than faithful and impartial performance, warranting removal. The New York Court of Appeals found the statements did violate the rules, as they compromised impartiality. However, considering Friedman’s remorse and lack of prior misconduct in office, the court modified the sanction from removal to censure, emphasizing the importance of judicial impartiality while acknowledging First Amendment rights.
Facts
Friedman, while running for Lockport City Court judge, made statements in letters, newspaper ads, and articles indicating he would “work with” police, assist law enforcement, and be tough on crime, especially drug offenses by out-of-towners. He cited rising arrest rates under incumbent judges, suggesting he would take different action to deter crime. He stated the city should establish a reputation for “zero tolerance” and deter criminals before they enter the city.
Procedural History
The Commission on Judicial Conduct filed a complaint against Friedman. A Referee found misconduct. Friedman acknowledged the violations and apologized. The Commission sustained the charge and recommended removal. Friedman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether Friedman’s campaign statements violated section 100.5(A)(4)(d)(i) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct by making pledges of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of duties.
2. Whether, if the rules were violated, the pledges or promises prohibition impermissibly abridges Friedman’s First Amendment rights.
3. Whether removal is the appropriate sanction.
Holding
1. Yes, because Friedman explicitly and repeatedly indicated that he intended to “work with” and “assist” police and other law enforcement personnel if elected to judicial office which indicated bias and amounted to a pledge to engage in conduct antithetical to the judicial role.
2. No, because New York’s pledges or promises clause is sufficiently circumscribed to withstand exacting scrutiny under the First Amendment, essential to maintaining impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in the state judiciary.
3. No, because Friedman expressed remorse and acknowledged poor judgment and the Commission made no claim of inappropriate behavior in the performance of Friedman’s judicial duties.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court found Friedman’s statements violated the rule against pledges compromising impartial judicial duties. The statements expressed bias favoring police and pledged conduct inconsistent with the judicial role of impartial application of law. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Shanley, where the phrase “law and order candidate” was deemed too generic to compromise impartiality.
Regarding the First Amendment challenge, the Court distinguished Republican Party of Minn. v. White, noting that New York’s rule doesn’t prohibit articulating views on legal issues, but only pledges compromising impartiality. The Court applied strict scrutiny (assuming it was appropriate) and found the rule narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of judicial impartiality. “The ability to be impartial is an indispensable requirement for a judicial officer” (Matter of Sardino v State Commn. on Jud. Conduct, 58 NY2d 286, 290 [1983]). The Court emphasized that the rule only precludes statements singling out parties for special treatment or conveying behavior inconsistent with impartial judicial duties.
On the sanction, the Court acknowledged the purpose of judicial discipline is to safeguard the bench, not punish. Considering Friedman’s remorse, inexperience, and lack of prior misconduct, the Court deemed removal too harsh. Censure was imposed as the appropriate sanction.