5 N.Y.3d 143 (2005)

A co-conspirator’s statements are admissible against another co-conspirator if a prima facie case of conspiracy is established, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims require a showing that counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial.

Summary

Carlos Caban was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder based on the testimony of George Castro, who stated Caban offered $5,000 to have a rival drug dealer, Angel Ortiz, killed. Ortiz was later murdered. Caban appealed, arguing that co-conspirator statements were improperly admitted and that his counsel was ineffective. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the co-conspirator statements were admissible because a prima facie case of conspiracy was established and that Caban’s counsel was not ineffective because the evidence did not establish Castro was an accomplice as a matter of law. The court emphasized the importance of independent evidence in corroborating accomplice testimony.

Facts

George Castro, a drug dealer working for Carlos Caban, testified that Caban offered $5,000 to kill Angel Ortiz, a rival drug dealer. Castro stated that Caban’s brother, Derrick Garcia, agreed to commit the murder, and another dealer, Pello Torres, offered to provide a gun. Ortiz was subsequently murdered by Garcia. Castro admitted involvement in a prior unsuccessful attempt on Ortiz’s life. Caban was charged with murder, manslaughter, conspiracy, and weapons possession. The jury convicted him only of conspiracy.

Procedural History

Caban was indicted and tried for murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the first degree, conspiracy in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in the Supreme Court, Bronx County. The jury convicted him of conspiracy but acquitted him of the other charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Caban appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the hearsay statements of co-conspirators were properly admitted without a prima facie case of conspiracy being established independent of the statements.
2. Whether Caban received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request that Castro be declared an accomplice as a matter of law and failed to move to dismiss the conspiracy count for lack of corroboration.

Holding

1. No, because the March 18 statements were nonhearsay with respect to the conspiracy charge, so the People had no obligation to establish a prima facie case for them to be admissible. The June 1 statement was permissible as the People introduced independent statements from Castro regarding the March 18 meeting that satisfied this burden.
2. No, because the evidence did not establish that Castro was an accomplice as a matter of law, and there was sufficient independent evidence to corroborate Castro’s testimony, even if he were considered an accomplice.

Court’s Reasoning

Regarding the admissibility of co-conspirator statements, the Court held that some of the challenged statements were relevant for different purposes regarding the different charges. The March 18 statements of Garcia and Torres were nonhearsay when offered to prove the conspiracy charge because they were verbal acts establishing the agreement, an essential element of conspiracy. The Court noted that “the `act’ of agreeing is concrete and unambiguous as an expression of each actor’s intent to violate the law.” Torres’s June 1 “It’s time” remark was hearsay but admissible under the co-conspirator exception because the prosecution had established a prima facie case of conspiracy, independent of the hearsay statements. This was done through Castro’s statements at the March 18 meeting and evidence of Garcia’s acceptance and Torres’s offer to procure the weapon.

Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court determined that Caban’s attorney was not ineffective because the evidence did not conclusively establish that Castro was an accomplice as a matter of law. The Court explained that a witness is an accomplice as a matter of law only if the jury could not reasonably reach any other conclusion. “[A] witness is an accomplice as a matter of law only if the jury could reasonably reach no other conclusion but that he participated in the offense charged.” Different inferences could be drawn from the proof of Castro’s involvement. Furthermore, the Court found that even if Castro were an accomplice, there was sufficient independent evidence to corroborate his testimony, fulfilling the requirements of CPL 60.22(1). The court stated, “New York’s accomplice corroboration protection . . . requires only enough nonaccomplice evidence to assure that the accomplices have offered credible probative evidence.” The Court found supporting evidence from Ortiz’s girlfriend, Garcia’s arrest, and police and medical examiner’s evidence of the location of Ortiz’s body that satisfied this corroboration requirement.