5 N.Y.3d 478 (2005)

A criminal defendant is deprived of their constitutional right to effective legal representation when both trial and appellate lawyers fail to recognize a statute of limitations defense that would have prevented the defendant’s conviction, constituting an egregious and prejudicial error.

Summary

Donald Turner was convicted of manslaughter for a 1982 shooting, but wasn’t arrested until 1998. At trial, his attorney failed to raise the statute of limitations (5 years for manslaughter), even when the prosecution requested a manslaughter charge. Turner’s appellate counsel also missed this, focusing instead on a Rosario violation. After unsuccessful federal habeas corpus proceedings, Turner filed a second petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to argue ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s grant of the writ, finding the missed statute of limitations defense an egregious error depriving Turner of effective counsel.

Facts

In 1982, Donald Holloman was fatally shot in Brooklyn. Witnesses identified Turner as the shooter, but he fled and wasn’t arrested until 1998, almost 16 years later.

Procedural History

Turner was indicted for second-degree murder (no statute of limitations). At trial in 1999, the prosecution requested a jury instruction for first-degree manslaughter as a lesser included offense. The defense opposed the charge on other grounds but didn’t raise the statute of limitations (5 years for manslaughter). He was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Turner’s application for a writ of error coram nobis arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was denied. The U.S. District Court denied habeas relief but suggested a claim based on appellate counsel’s failure to argue trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Turner then filed a second coram nobis petition, which the Appellate Division granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed this grant.

Issue(s)

1. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective.
2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the statute of limitations defense.

Holding

1. Yes, because the failure to raise such a clear and dispositive defense, without a reasonable explanation, falls below an objective standard of reasonableness for effective assistance of counsel.
2. Yes, because no reasonable defense lawyer could have found the statute of limitations argument so weak as to be not worth raising, given existing case law and the potential for a winning argument.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on both the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution, which guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court acknowledged the Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance, requiring a showing that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this prejudiced the defendant. While acknowledging a deferential standard for reviewing counsel’s performance, the Court found this case presented a rare instance where a single error—failure to raise a clear statute of limitations defense—was so egregious and prejudicial as to constitute ineffective assistance. The Court found that the statute of limitations defense was clearly applicable, and the existing case law at the time (specifically People v. Di Pasquale) supported the argument that even as a lesser included offense, the time-barred manslaughter charge should not have been submitted to the jury. The Court dismissed arguments that trial counsel might have strategically welcomed the manslaughter charge, noting that counsel actually opposed the charge. It also rejected the idea that appellate counsel could reasonably forego the statute of limitations argument in favor of another argument, since the omitted argument was so strong and could have been raised in addition to the other point. The court explicitly stated, “Such a failure, in the absence of a reasonable explanation for it, is hard to reconcile with a defendant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.”