6 N.Y.3d 104 (2005)
In judicial review of a rent agency decision regarding eviction certificates, courts are generally limited to the factual record before the agency when its determination was rendered and may not consider events that occurred after the agency made its final determination.
Summary
George Rizzo, a rent-controlled tenant, faced partial eviction after the landlord, Rachel Crespin, sought to subdivide his and another tenant’s (Bloedow) apartments, claiming she couldn’t achieve an 8.5% return on the property. DHCR initially granted Crespin’s application. After DHCR’s determination but before Rizzo’s Article 78 proceeding was resolved, Bloedow died, deregulating her apartment. Rizzo argued this changed Crespin’s financial picture. The Court of Appeals held that the Supreme Court exceeded its authority by remitting the case to DHCR for de novo review based on Bloedow’s death, which occurred after DHCR’s final order. Judicial review is limited to the record before the agency at the time of its determination. The Court emphasized the need for finality in administrative decisions.
Facts
Rachel Crespin owned a four-story apartment building in Manhattan. George Rizzo was a rent-controlled tenant occupying a large apartment. Crespin applied for certificates of partial eviction against Rizzo and another tenant (Bloedow) to subdivide their apartments, alleging financial hardship. DHCR regulations permit such eviction if the landlord cannot achieve an 8.5% return on the property without it and the apartment is under-occupied. DHCR, after an audit and hearing based on 1996 financials, granted the application in 2000.
Procedural History
DHCR’s Deputy Commissioner denied Rizzo and Bloedow’s petitions for administrative review. Rizzo commenced an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, seeking reversal and remittal. Supreme Court vacated DHCR’s determination and remitted for reprocessing, citing the deregulation of Bloedow’s apartment due to her death after DHCR’s decision. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Supreme Court exceeded the scope of judicial review by considering evidence outside the administrative record. Rizzo appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a reviewing court, in an Article 78 proceeding challenging a DHCR determination granting a certificate of eviction, may remit the matter to DHCR for de novo review based on events that occurred after DHCR’s final determination.
Holding
No, because judicial review of administrative determinations is confined to the facts and record before the agency when its determination was rendered.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court emphasized that judicial review of administrative decisions is limited to the record before the agency at the time of its determination. It cited Matter of Yarbough v. Franco, 95 NY2d 342, 347 (2000), stating that judicial review is confined to the facts and record adduced before the agency. While New York City Administrative Code § 26-411(a)(2) allows for the introduction of additional evidence, the Court interpreted this to apply only to facts existing *before* the agency’s determination. Allowing consideration of subsequent events would defeat finality and subject agency orders to endless review. The Court distinguished Matter of McMurray v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal (72 NY2d 1022 [1988]) because it involved a different provision with a legislative history showing intent to protect long-term tenants regardless of the timing of the landlord’s application. Here, there’s no indication the legislature intended ongoing de novo review of the landlord’s ability to achieve an 8.5% return. The dissent argued that the remedial nature of rent control laws requires considering new evidence to prevent unwarranted evictions and preserve affordable housing, especially given the Sound Housing Act’s goal of preventing evictions when a fair return is possible. The majority rejected this, prioritizing finality and adherence to the administrative record at the time of the decision.