People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28 (2006)
While expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification is admissible under certain circumstances, a trial court’s jury instruction stating that such testimony cannot be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony is erroneous when read in isolation, but may not require reversal if the charge as a whole conveys the correct standard.
Summary
Drake was convicted of assault after an eyewitness identified him as the perpetrator of a brick attack. The trial court allowed expert testimony regarding factors affecting eyewitness identification but instructed the jury that this testimony could not be used to either discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony. The New York Court of Appeals held that this specific instruction, taken by itself, was erroneous, but that, viewing the jury charge in its entirety, the jury was properly instructed on how to consider expert testimony. Thus, the conviction was upheld.
Facts
Nicole Barrett was seriously injured when struck in the head with a brick in Manhattan. Several eyewitnesses were present. Defendant Drake was arrested and charged with the assault after an investigation. At trial, the key issue was identification. Some eyewitnesses identified Drake as the attacker, while others did not, or were uncertain.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court granted defendant’s pretrial motion to admit expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, subject to limitations. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury that the expert testimony could not be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony, to which the defendant objected. Drake was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether a jury instruction stating that expert testimony on eyewitness identification cannot be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony constitutes reversible error.
Holding
No, because while the instruction was erroneous when read in isolation, the court’s charge, taken as a whole, conveyed to the jury the correct standard as to the proper use of expert testimony.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the challenged jury instruction was “improper and should not have been used” (People v. Fields, 87 NY2d 821, 823 [1995]). The court reasoned that the instruction could have been taken to mean that the expert testimony could not be considered for any purpose. The court emphasized that jurors are always free to accept or reject expert evidence. It clarified that jurors must be permitted to apply the identified psychological factors to the facts of the case in deciding whether they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identifications if they accept the expert’s testimony. The court then focused on the charge as a whole. It noted that the charge expressly instructed the jury that the expert testimony was admitted to provide factors relevant to a person’s ability to perceive and remember, and that the jury was the sole judge of the reliability and credibility of the eyewitness testimony. The court concluded that no reasonable juror could have concluded that the expert’s testimony had been effectively stricken from the case. The court cited People v. Russell, 266 NY 147, 153 (1934) for the proposition that “[t]he test is always whether the jury, hearing the whole charge, would gather from its language the correct rules which should be applied in arriving at decision”.